From: Wei Dai (weidai@weidai.com)
Date: Sun May 25 2003 - 21:21:10 MDT
On Sun, May 25, 2003 at 11:44:38AM -0700, Hal Finney wrote:
> And I think it is important in the definition of the Prisoner's Dilemma
> that you do know what the payoffs are for the other guy. Just seeing
> and knowing your own payoffs is not enough to create the dilemma.
Although the classical PD formulation assumes common knowledge of both
parties utility functions, I'm sure I can come up with a version where
each side only has probabilistic knowledge of each other's utilities.
These types of games are regularly studied under the name "games with
incomplete information".
> Without analyzing it in detail, I think this level of honesty,
> in conjunction with the usual game theory assumption of rationality,
> would be enough to imply the result that the two parties can't disagree.
> Basically the argument is the same, that since you both have the same
> goals [...]
But the totalist and the averagist do not have the same goals. One wants
to maximize total happiness, and the other wants to maximize average
happiness.
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