From: Rafal Smigrodzki (rafal@smigrodzki.org)
Date: Wed Apr 30 2003 - 13:12:10 MDT
Mike Lorrey wrote:
> --- Rafal Smigrodzki <rafal@smigrodzki.org> wrote:
>> Mike Lorrey wrote:
>>>
>>> What I find interesting is that those who espouse 1) are also
>>> generally atheistic, though there are buddhists as well. The atheist
>>> vegetarian who argues a moral argument can't give a rationale for
>>> their moral argument that is not grounded in theology. Furthermore,
>>> if completely ignores the fact that there is far more suffering of
>>> animals when they overpopulate due to overgrazing and lack of
>>> sustainable predation than when animals are regularly slaughtered
>>> quickly. Starvation is a very painful way to die.
>>>
>>
>> The long-term rational observer could argue that a person'scommitment
>> to the minimization of suffering in general is a predictor for future
>> unwillingness to inflict suffering on the observer, and moralistic
>> vegetarianism could be a marker for the strength of this commitment,
>> albeit a very imperfect one. Therefore, the observer, in the
>> interest of limiting the risk of others inflicting suffering on him
>> in the future, might advance the idea of vegetarianism, and
>> cooperate preferentially with vegetarians.
>> Since cooperation from rational vegetarians could only be expected if
>> the observer himself shows the same commitment to minimization of
>> suffering, the observer might have to adapt the vegetarian behavior
>> as a sign of commitment.
>>
>> This is directly analogous to antlers displayed by deer, and public
>> charity shown by the rich - costly signs of prowess or moral
>> rectitude.
>
> Only if one is a dunce. A rational observer would not make the
> irrational conflation of non-sentient animals with sentient beings and
> thus irrationally equate animal and sentient rights.
### I was talking about prevention of suffering in general, not about
rights. I also did not mention sentience, conflation of anything with
anything else, and I didn't talk about dunces, either.
If a deeply held dislike for inflicting suffering is a predictor for future
unwillingness to inflict pain on me, then it is very rational of me to trust
persons exhibiting this dislike.
Rafal
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