From: Ramez Naam (mez@apexnano.com)
Date: Tue Apr 29 2003 - 19:43:50 MDT
From: gts [mailto:gts_2000@yahoo.com]
> >
> > There are two fourth balls. The fourth ball from the short
> > sequence looks at itself, follows your argument, and says,
> > "I must be in the short
> > sequence!" The fourth ball from the long sequence looks at
itself,
> > follows your argument, and says, "I must be in the short
sequence!"
> >
> > We therefore find that the gts-conclusion "I must be in the short
> > sequence!" calibrates to an actual 50% chance of being in the
> > long sequence.
>
> Your argument fails Eliezer because there are not two fourth
> balls. There is only you, the observer.
If that's the case, then mustn't the whole DA fail because it depends
on hypothetical entities?
In any case, Eliezer's thought experiment is a great illustration of
my original objection which started this thread. So far in time, on
this planet, the DA has been wrong every single time it's been
invoked. So, shouldn't that cast some doubt on the DA? And shouldn't
that *concrete evidence* take precedence over the rather arbitrary
assumptions about random sampling and distribution of populations that
the DA depends on?
mez
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