From: Keith Elis (hagbard@ix.netcom.com)
Date: Tue Apr 15 2003 - 08:29:54 MDT
Lee Corbin:
--- "An off-list correspondent has brought to my attention that I began using the term "ESS" (Evolutionarily Stable Strategy) as if it were /wrong/ Evolutionarily Successful Strategy /wrong/. "ESS is a term perhaps first used by John Maynard Smith in his book "Evolution and the Theory of Games". My familiarity with the term comes from Axelrod's work in the late eighties ---probably many of you are familiar with the "Tit-for-tat" results, and the issues concerning whether or not a society can be invaded by strangers who have different strategies for cooperation or defection. "Some time in the last five years I have began loosely using the term to refer to what is merely a "successful strategy" for a subgroup or subspecies, or a memeplex, which waxes dominant within its larger group. Sorry for the confusion. The term ESS should be used only in the narrower sense." --- You're right. But imagine an early tribe where every individual's failure in the hunt was made public to the tribe. Every hunter stands to gain by making as big a deal as possible about the others' failures. However, the top 20% of hunters gain the most as they fail the least. The middle 60% gain when they are successful as well. But, they also gain when their more frequent failures are kept under wraps. The bottom 20% has very little to gain by being open and honest about failures. If 80% of hunters fail enough to gain from keeping failures quiet, failures will be kept quiet more often. This trend would vary according to another variable, that of reciprocity. Where keeping failures quiet is likely to be reciprocated, the worst hunters are much more likely to keep them quiet. Eventually, the percentage of failures made public would stabilize at the optimum for all competing skill levels. Reciprocal "face-saving" thus emerges. This appears to me to be worthy of the label 'ESS'. Perhaps I'm wrong. Keith
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Tue Apr 15 2003 - 08:36:42 MDT