From: Lee Corbin (lcorbin@tsoft.com)
Date: Tue Apr 15 2003 - 00:33:58 MDT
Keith writes
> For some people to believe X is a threat, there must be
> hard evidence, and theory is not enough. For some people
> to believe that X may be a threat in the future, less
> evidence is required, and a good theory may be enough.
I did note that during the pre-war debate that a number
of people (not on this list) allowed the meme "guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt" to affect their judgment.
One problem (!) with the people on this list is that
they don't hang out enough in tough bars, where much
more standard "rules" hold. We evolved in situations
that put a lot of stress on intuition; our responses
of anger, submission, and intimidation are innate, and
not always fully comprehendible yet by our rational
natures.
> (Summing-up amidst charges of being academic...)
> It will eventually fall to academics (which I am
> not) to review the theories propounded as
> rationales for pre-emption.
What is scary about many real-world situations is that
they might not yield to academic analysis.
"Street Smarts" are something that very few of the gentle
readers of the Extropian mail list can claim to have. It
amounts to, so far as this equally innocent poster is aware,
presenting a public aspect that intimidates or in other
ways deters those who would take advantage of one. (Also
is conveyed, of course, by the term, is wisdom that would
guide you in avoiding unwanted confrontations and not
presenting yourself as a target of opportunity.) So many
of the world's civilized people, like you and me, have
not ever understood what comes very easily to bullies
and those who have to live near them. We more or less
expect everyone to behave the way our neighbors do, and
sadly, we then project our intuitive expectations into
realms where they are not appropriate.
There have been a number of lessons emerging from recent
events, so far. (How many more will emerge is anyone's
guess, as hardly needs to be said.) It now seems probable
that there were
* subtle internal forces in the West that naturally
allied themselves with the horrors of Hussein's
regime. Certain modes of thought, certain
systematic misjudgments.
* a serious lack of good intuition concerning the
motivations and psychology of the Iraqis, and
perhaps many other Arab countries as well (Where
are all the terrorist reprisals that so many of
us, not excluding me, were certain would occur
when an invasion commenced?)
* (and as Keith points out) a serious intuitive
lack of understanding of the role and effects of
threats and actions; perhaps even a similar
misunderstandings of the realities of dominance
and submission.
The aspirations of many people around the world, and the
understandable resentment that many have against the United
States are very real, and are not without justification IMO.
(More about this in another post.)
The situation is so very much complicated by the acknowledgment
that many of us have to feel that once again somehow the United
States has been proved to have been right; whatever the shifting
justifications for the war have been; whatever total package
of motivations has been or is involved; whatever bad omens
have arisen and worries the future exacerbated---the bottom line
is that goals have been furthered that practically all of us on
this list would endorse.
Future historians might well wonder exactly what, following
the end of the cold war, took the United States so long in
getting rid of an enemy like the Baathists. It now appears
that the Baath party is similar to the Nazi party in many
ways, whereas we have been conceiving of Iraq as though
Hussein had been a simple Latin American strongman. Should
members of the Baath party be hunted down wherever they are?
Future historians may think that even asking such a question
to be symptomatic of the malaise and peculiar lack of
confidence the West has in its own ideals.
Lee
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