From: Lee Corbin (lcorbin@tsoft.com)
Date: Sat Apr 05 2003 - 17:36:19 MST
Eliezer writes
> When I teleport, I want to anticipate a 100% subjective probability
> of being where I'm going, not a 50% subjective probability of being
> where I'm going. I therefore want to be moved, not copied.
I think that it is the deepest mistake I've been able to
identify in a decades-long examination of the identity
paradox to suppose that it's a question of probability.
In other words, if you teleport to point B and your point A
version is not disintegrated, then with 100% probability
you arrive at B *and* with 100% probability you remain at A.
Needless to say, this is highly counter-intuitive, and although
evolution has prepared us for understanding being at two times
in the same place, we are unprepared for the logically equally
real possibility of being in two places at the same time.
That you *should* anticipate being in both places is demonstrated
by the possibility that later the memories conceivably could be
merged; at that point, it would be apparent to the future you
that it had been a mistake not to anticipate both possibilities.
If you were fleeing a horrible situation by teleport, it would
be understandable that no you would wish to remain at A. But
under normal circumstances, your life's goals would be advanced
by remaining at A along with going to B.
Lee
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