From: Rafal Smigrodzki (rafal@smigrodzki.org)
Date: Thu Apr 03 2003 - 14:36:47 MST
On Thu, 2003-04-03 at 12:15, Greg Jordan wrote:
>
> On 2 Apr 2003, Rafal Smigrodzki wrote:
>
> > ### In a previous post I pointed out that some elements of your position
> > seem to be associated with moral relativism. Please do not take it as
> > saying that *you* are a moral relativist, especially since this
> > description has acquired some features of a term of abuse. Still,
> > extending the line of reasoning you started in this thread might lead in
> > that direction, and this is why I want to oppose it.
>
> I am one of the 1,001 types of relativists, but not an "absolute
> relativist". I don't owe blind loyalty to "moralities" (evolved human
> customs which may be irrational or non-beneficial to me), but I have a
> situated viewpoint, and an embodiment, which give me a very definite
> subjective position. That position undergirds my "aesthetics" because I am
> very self-consciously aware of how things matter *to me* (not to the
> abstract Generalhuman, or God, or Society, etc.). I assume everyone else
> may also be just as aware of how things matter *to them*, which could be
> something very different than it is with me.
### If interpreted in this sense, all of us are relativist, including
me, but this is not really the sense I objected to.
--------------------
>
> > To summarize my impressions about your views, you were saying that
> > "force" or "violence" are strictly aesthetic concepts, have no important
> > relationship to the concept of reciprocity, that there is no substantial
> > ethical difference between violence as I defined it (e.g. rape and
> > murder), and "economic force", including the subjective harm of seeing a
> > billboard. You are blurring any ethical distinctions between voluntary
> > and involuntary acts, denying the existence of voluntary interactions.
>
> I see an *ethical* difference between violence such as rape and murder on
> the one hand, and putting up billboards, on the other hand. But
> I analyze them both mechanically as exercises of force. One exercise of
> force I would really object to being applied to myself, the other exercise
> of force I would only mildly object to being applied to myself. (I am
> politically so lazy I could not imagine bothering to try to stop people
> from putting up billboards. There are so many other more efficient ways to
> improve my lifestyle.)
>
> Voluntary acts arise from decision-making centers
> in the brain, which are formed mechanically by conception and birth
> (cellular replication and differentiation of the organ) and environmental
> influences (chemical environments during the previous stage, sensory
> inputs, conceptual memories, etc. etc.). As systems, they process input to
> provide feedback. They are continually open and dynamic to the
> environment, exercising force (ultimately through muscular controls) and
> having forces exercised upon them. I am not trying to reduce analysis, but
> this is the real ground of the explanation of why economic forces can
> affect"voluntary" decisions. Everything is ultimately grounded in one system -
> force cannot be attributed to one original cause or traced to any final
> single consequence.
>
> > Furthermore, you postulated the need to use complex rules to replace
> > legal principles derived through hundreds of years of legal practice
> > from the simple distinctions I described, although you did not provide
> > a means of assessing the validity of such complex rules. Also, you deny
> > the validity of personal responsibility, instead describing individual
> > behaviors as results of "forces" depriving an individual of choices.
> > Finally, you define ethics aesthetics in a manner at odds with commonly
> > accepted usage.
>
> Assessing the validity of the complex rules - the validity of the theories
> have to rest in the best, most all-encompassing understanding of human
> beings and their societies and cultures we have. Certainly a work in
> progress, but the law in most cases has been insulated from many insights
> of the various disciplines. Perhaps the reason is that any adjustment
> would involve mind-boggling, wholesale changes - even a displacement of
> "law" as we know it.
>
> Personal responsibility is real at a certain level, the level of personal
> introspection through cultural categories. But in the most detailed,
> material analysis it disappears. To put it into a simplistic
> slogan: nobody is ultimately responsible for anything - everything just is
> the way it is. Part of what a lot of things are, is "responsible". But
> they are not ultimately responsible for being responsible :)
>
### Playing with subtly shifting definitions of common terms, to derive
startling conclusions ("law should be displaced (=abandoned)", "nobody
is responsible for anything") is a moderately pleasant pastime, but I
was approaching our discussion with concern for the practicalities of
building and maintaining social and legal systems capable of meeting my
needs. Indefinite verbal constructions tend to interfere with such
practicalities, undermining the rationale for further discussion.
Rafal
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