From: Michael M. Butler (mmb@spies.com)
Date: Fri Mar 14 2003 - 12:41:03 MST
I'll try to put my thoghts down in sme sort of coherent way by the weekend.
In the mean time, forwarded from my friend Dan L., the below.
"A DISMAL THOUGHT: I'm left with the conclusion that we will only get such
consensus in favor of pre-emption after the destruction of a major Western
city, or a chemical or biological catastrophe. In this sense, Blair and
Bush may simply be ahead of their time. And what they see as the potential
threat is so depressing and terrifying that it's perhaps only
understandable that the world for a while will wish to look the other way.
The truth is and we may as well admit it: we have failed to convince the
world, just as Churchill failed to convince the world in the 1930s. And as
9/11 recedes a little, we are even tempted to falter in this dreadful
analysis ourselves.
"The difference between now and the 1930s, of course, is that we may now
have Churchill in office - but before the world has become convinced of his
rectitude: history repeated as a deeply tragic farce.
"STILL, SKEPTICISM: To add to the complications, we may be right about the
basic analysis but wrong in this particular case." --Andrew Sullivan
> Grist for the mill.... I tried to find more Lee Harris stuff (referenced
> below) but the link referred to was dead, for now at least. But I did
> find this unrelated quote:
>
>> One of the most tragic victims of liberal ideology has been liberal
>> idealism, by which I mean the impulse to make the world a better place.
>> For nowadays the question that most preoccupies liberals is not so much
>> whether good is being done, but whether it is being done the right way,
>> or‹even worse‹whether it is being done by the right party. For the goal
>> is no longer one of trying to improve the lot of the average human being
>> by any means practicable, but rather the implementation of a social
>> policy that is in accordance with the conventional dogmas of modern
>> liberalism. -- Lee Harris
>
> Gonna have to research more on Robert Kaplan as well.
>
> Anyway, this is Andrew Sullivan's blog front page for the day, which
> references these two fellows.
>
> =d
>
>
> http://www.andrewsullivan.com/
>
> Wednesday, March 12, 2003
>
> ARE WE IN A REALLY NEW WORLD? Yesterday, I suggested that in some ways,
> we're headed backward toward the nineteenth century. This stimulating,
> long,
> essay by Lee Harris in TCS argues the opposite: that weapons of mass
> destruction together with fantasist Islamism or nihilist totalitarianism
> make our predicament completely and world-historically new. I wish I
> could
> see a way to rebut this theory easily, but I cannot. I've learned a lot
> from
> Robert Kaplan's analysis of a complete security breakdown in whole parts
> of
> the globe; what I haven't put together coherently in my own head -
> because
> I'm afraid to? - is what the combination of world anarchy and destructive
> technology could lead to. In the past, we conceived of the threat of
> warfare
> coming from rival states which had built up various means of economic and
> thereby military strength. But now we have the reality of completely weak
> states, or parasitic states, or failed states or neo-states (like al
> Qaeda)
> getting nukes by buying them, or stealing them or smuggling the component
> parts. They can also find ways to detonate them anonymously so that the
> civilized world is incapable of rational response or even rational
> deterrence. It seems to me that the chances of something like this
> happening are extremely high.
>
> THE PRE-EMPTIVE OPTION: Which leaves us with very few good options. But
> the
> obvious one is pro-active pre-emption: going in and getting rid of such
> regimes and entities, destroying them, or occupying them. But doing so -
> invading terrorism-sponsoring states, before they have formally attacked
> us
> - violates the basic principles of the international order we have
> understandably come to cherish. So we have a profound - and new -
> conflict
> between security and sovereignty, between a catastrophe-free world and
> international law. You might be able to find a way to square this cricle
> if
> all the civilized countries in the world agreed about the nature of this
> new
> threat and exercized collective security against rogue states - but it
> would
> have to be collective security with one standard for the civilized world
> and
> one for everywhere else. Our current U.N. (which includes rogues states
> and
> makes no distinction between them and others) naturally doesn't recognize
> such a double-standard. Moreover our civilized partners simply don't
> believe
> that the threat is that grave. Even after 9/11, even many Americans don't
> believe the threat is that serious. This is therefore the key context of
> our
> current impasse. Europeans simply don't believe that we're living in a
> radically more dangerous and unstable world. Or they think that mild
> measures can temporarily solve the problem - like porous and largely
> inneffective inspection regimes in Iraq. So we are at a deadlock. And if
> we
> cannot get consensus on Iraq - with umpteen U.N. resolutions and the
> precedent of a previous unprovoked war - what hope is there of getting
> consensus if Iran's mullahs go nuclear? Or North Korea's nut-case gets
> several nukes? Or someone else out there we have yet to hear from decides
> to
> go to heaven via a suitcase nuke in L.A.?
>
> A DISMAL THOUGHT: I'm left with the conclusion that we will only get such
> a
> consensus in favor of pre-emption after the destruction of a major
> Western
> city, or a chemical or biological catastrophe. In this sense, Blair and
> Bush
> may simply be ahead of their time. And what they see as the potential
> threat
> is so depressing and terrifying that it's perhaps only understandabl that
> the world for a while will wish to look the other way. The truth is and
> we
> may as well admit it: we have failed to convince the world, just as
> Churchill failed to convince the world in the 1930s. And as 9/11 recedes
> a
> little, we are even tempted to falter in this dreadful analysis
> ourselves.
> The difference between now and the 1930s, of course, is that we may now
> have
> Churchill in office - but before the world has become convinced of his
> rectitude: history repeated as a deeply tragic farce.
>
> STILL, SKEPTICISM: To add to the complications, we may be right about the
> basic analysis but wrong in this particular case. Perhaps North Korea is
> more potentially dangerous and therefore worthy of more immediate
> attention
> than Iraq. We live in an opaque world, however good our intelligence,
> however solid our leadership. I liked this point of Harris's:
>
>> Once the world-historical magnitude of the risk is understood, it is
>> possible
>> for men of good will to differ profoundly over the wisdom of this or
>> that
>> particular response - and not only possible, but necessary. But this
>> must be
>> done in a climate free of pettiness and personalities: the cult of naïve
>> cynicism - that oxymoron that characterizes so much of what passes today
>> for
>> intellectual sophistication - must be dismantled and as soon as possible
>> if we
>> are to make our response as intelligent and as creative as it must and
>> can be.
>> To call prudence appeasement is wrong. But to call the United States'
>> response
>> a bid for empire is simply silly.
>
> I'm a little chastened by that criticism. Some on the far left and right
> are
> indeed appeasing, or even sympathizing with the enemy. Others on the near
> left are putting partisanship before strategic clarity. (Others on the
> left
> are fully clear-sighted about what is at stake.) But some criticism of
> our
> Iraq policy is well-intentioned and based not on denial but mere
> prudential
> disagreement. On balance, I think war against Saddam now is essential. In
> fact, in retrospect, I fear we may have lost a lot by not going to war
> unilaterally months ago. But the most important thing - and this is th
> main
> import of Harris' essay - is to remember the new realities we're all
> trying
> to make sense of. Just because they're truly terrifying doesn't mean we
> can
> safely try to forget them. And it is impossible to keep that context
> clear
> in our minds without also constantly remembering that day eighteen months
> ago. There really is a connection between 9/11 and Iraq - at the deepest
> and
> most meaningful level imaginable. We may endure more such days before we
> summon the will to do what we have to. Or we may have the luck and the
> leadership to prevent it. I'm praying for the latter.
>
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