From: Lee Corbin (lcorbin@tsoft.com)
Date: Fri Mar 14 2003 - 01:41:39 MST
Steve Davies writes
> Michael Butler wrote
> > If no one else does, I might be forced to unilaterally write an
> > exegesis of this.
http://www.techcentralstation.com/1051/defensewrapper.jsp?PID=1051-350&CID=1051-031103AWell: PEA
> Thanks for this reference.
> Basically I think that the diagnosis is pretty accurate but in some ways not
> pessimistic enough. However I think that the prescription is both
> unrealistic and potentially disastrous both for America and the rest of the
> world.
> ...
> 4. The article connects the problems posed by WMD to the malfunctioning of a
> system of sovereign states. The assumption is you need a state to create
> such devices or supply them to crazies such as Al Quaida.
He did mention the possibility of nuclear weapons falling
into their hands by chance. I thought that he was more
worried about rogue states offering cover.
> I'm afraid I am more pessimistic than he is in some ways, I think
> you don't need to be a state or have the backing of one to cause huge havoc,
> given the interconnected and centralised organisation of our civilisation.
Yes, this will become truer over time. My own long-term
hope to counter this is either (A) a Singularity, or (B)
The Transparent Society.
> 5. My main criticism is this. His solution to the problem is something
> called neo-sovereignty, effectively an American Empire (ok a benign hegemony
> if you prefer). Why should the second rank powers put up with this? All the
> historic precedents suggest that a policy like this will simply produce an
> alliance of other lesser powers against the hegemon
Yes, exactly. That's what the historical perspective does
suggest. But it has been more than 10 years since the
U.S.S.R. fell, and so why haven't Japan and Germany
re-armed? To me it's most probable that the unification
success of the EU can be traced to an inevitable urge on
their part to be a "player" in the big game.
Obviously, the more an American administration "cuts corners"
by not trying to go through the U.N., by not trying as hard
as it can to woo foreign leaders, then the larger and sooner
the chances for the emergence of a global challenger. What
else explains George Bush being on the telephone day after
day after day, trying to recruit everyone from Russia to
Cameroon to be on board?
> which will raise the costs of such a policy (in every sense)
> to an unacceptably high level.
I don't understand. (But then, maybe I've been warped by
growing up knowing that Soviet missiles were aimed at a
spot only 12 miles from me.) So what if a benign hegemon
like the U.S. seizes Iraq? Maybe next time, the Germans
and French will seize Bosnia themselves when tragedy strikes.
"Spheres of Influence" is an old, old reality.
I wouldn't even be nervous if the E.U. pointed a lot of
missiles at the U.S.---you see, I grew up with that. I'm
much more afraid that China might act more like Japan or
Germany than the conservative Russians, when it comes to
MAD. You can bet your bottom dollar that if Germany or
Japan had faced-off another nuclear superpower for 50 years,
something very bad would have happened.
> It's no good saying "They'll accept it because it's in their
> interest". The response is likely to be "Thanks, but no thanks".
Of course. That much is obvious.
Lee
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