From: Rafal Smigrodzki (rafal@smigrodzki.org)
Date: Sat Mar 08 2003 - 15:28:22 MST
---- Original Message -----
From: "Lee Corbin" <lcorbin@tsoft.com>
> Rafal writes
> > ### One way of avoiding the conundrum is to use Rawl's veil of
ignorance,
> > put yourself in the position of the experimental subject, and consider
one
> > additional option - not flipping the coin at all. You can decide to run
the
> > good experience only, giving the test subject a certainty of good
experience
>
> In other words, forget about the coin, and just proceed straight
> to the generous and kind choice of supplying a beneficial
> experience with 100% probability. Well... of course this "avoids"
> the conundrum, and also thereby ignores its lesson.
>
> You're quite right that this would be the more moral choice, but
> we don't learn anything from it. The real question is, should you
> flip this coin, thereby causing its attendant consequences, or
> should you by default cause nothing to occur?
>
> Now change the polarity so that in 90% of the cases the subject
> will have a bad experience, and in only ten a good experience.
> Should the coin be flipped in this case, or is the default
> (nothing occurs) to be preferred?
### There is no default when a sentient starts thinking. You can be good,
9good/1bad, 1good/9bad, totally bad, do nothing, or anything in between. The
presence of parallelism does not directly change the valuation, except in
the
presence of multiple local copies (when our seven levels of identity kick
in), or if the single local copy adjusts its
wishes in some way to the knowledge about the four levels. Either way, it is
the local preference of sentients that constitutes the basis for ethics. All
ethics is local, that is my contention.
--------------------------
>
> > In level III there is the additional wrinkle of your actions causally
> > influencing the quantum evolution of the whole experimental system.
> > Basically, when making the decision you decohere into three versions, or
> > sheaves of histories - the no-coin-flip, the choose-90% and choose-10%
> > histories (the last sheaf of histories is equivalent to you turning
into a
> > sadist, I think). Your subjective experience of making the decision is
the
> > equivalent of a quantum process of decoherence, whose outcomes will have
> > different measures depending on the properties of the system (your
brain).
> > If your brain is influenced by my words, on the classical level, it will
be
> > accompanied by an increase in the measure of branches with the
no-coin-flip
> > experiment on the MWI, or level III analysis.
>
> Yes. Because you have benevolently assumed that the "no coin flip"
> option results in the same circumstances for the subject as the
> favorable outcome does. Isn't that right?
### Yes.
--------------------
>
> > In this case the conclusion is still the same as in level I and II,
> > you should skip the flip and choose good, in accordance with Tegmark's
> > statement that level III does not increase the number of distinct
entities
> > (or types of particle configurations) compared to level I and II. There
> > will be also an infinite number of level I copies of you decohering into
> > the three sheaves, but without a direct causal relationship to each
other.
>
> How does the conclusion depend on which level we are discussing?
> (Although I do appreciate you clarifying what physically happens.)
### I mean to say that the considering the physically different levels still
should lead to the same conclusion.
------------------------
> > As aside to Lee, you are also not duty-bound to make them in first
place.
>
> I agree. Nor is one duty-bound to aid drowning swimmers,
> or victims one comes across by chance in traffic accidents.
> (Aside to Dr. Smigrodzki: are *you* duty-bound by the laws
> of your state or country to go to their aid?)
### AFAIK, I am not, although the state of Virginia could draft me in case
of a disaster.
-----------------------------
>
> It's simply not my responsibility whether or not someone
> drowns who I happen to notice while walking along the beach.
> Nonetheless, I adamantly claim that one *ought* to help out
> when one can. But it is by no means an obligation or duty,
> especially in a free country.
### I agree.
-----------------------
>
> But suppose that I could press a button here on my desk, and
> a random human being who happens to live about 10^10^29 meters
> from here gets a new copy going among us. Let me further state
> that he or she will neither be a burden nor an asset to the
> rest of humanity in the new location, but will---after a
> relatively short time of disorientation---come to experience
> great happiness among us.
### That is the point - you are assuming the existence of a device changing
a non-local situation into a local one - one that you can influence directly
with your actions. This is as much of a difference as the difference between
the unconceived children and drowning swimmers (although a different one).
Rafal
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