From: scerir (scerir@libero.it)
Date: Thu Mar 06 2003 - 02:51:29 MST
Hal
However, the notion of many-worlds at Tegmark's level 1 and 2 suggests
that we do have to consider identical universes to add to the measure
and probability of the experiences they contain.
Spudboy
The answer is to give the cosmos, our cosmos, a purpose.
Call it a living, evolving, purpose; because such interactions,
if such are possible, would create their own synergy.
Lee
Isn't it just to increment that which makes lives worth living?
Namely, joy, fulfillment, satisfaction, rapture, contentment,
technolust...
--- Can we say that the 'universal' or 'global' (does it make sense?) information increases? Can we say, at least, that the quality (subjective concept?) of information increases? If I remember well, Tegmark used to say, in one of his first TOE papers, that the global information is zero, or something like that. But, maybe, with MWI, inflations, and simulations, and all that, the global information increases. Ok, there is a classic problem here. That one saying that all information within the output of a given 'program' cannot be greater than the information within the program itself. And there is another conceptual problem. Sometimes (i.e. q.entanglements, q.measurements, etc.) it is difficult to say if the information resides in the relations between the objects, or in the objects (which could be different from what we thought). I remember that Von Weizsaecker (since 1955) pointed out the possible existence of 'abstract' and maybe 'potential' primordial entities, named 'Urs'. There also was a striking coincidence with 'big' or 'magic' numbers of the (known) universe (without MWI, inflations, etc.). http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9611048 Recently it turned out that those 'Urs' are. more or less, the qubits! But, at that time, people thought Von Weizsaecker has got some illness. http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0212084
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