From: Brett Paatsch (paatschb@ocean.com.au)
Date: Mon Feb 24 2003 - 06:59:30 MST
Damien Broderick wrote:
<snip>
> Might a megalomaniac trapped in a fatal corner think like
> that? I don't know. Will his likely successors know that
> he will think like that and try to nip any such plan in the
> bud before he and his village pals get a chance
> to put it into effect? Will they be able to?
>
> Game theory might find this kind of quandary rather too
> complex and uncertain to model.
I had a sort of rough "game theory" model which really is
too long to post that involved giving Saddam two very stark
choices surrender himself into UN custody and live out his life
in some sort of newly formed UN sin-bin with his personal
security guaranteed by the security council (including the US)
and plenty of opportunity to write his life story on how he
came to be him - ie. he could serve some practical use as a
bad example and a living illustration of an alternate fate for other
despots the Security Council might call out, so long as he was
separated from the levers of power, why not let him enjoy a
little media celebrity status. As the price for getting him out of
Iraq without a war it seems cheap.
With a sin-bid established the Security Council would have
something to offer rough state leaders as a slightly better
incentive to turn themselves over without a fight. That would
be the carrot. The stick would be that if he didn't turn himself
over in 24 hours say of getting the offer it would be revoked
and a price would go on his head. Say 50 million euros
dead or alive. Of course this sort of clear choice is hard to
present to Saddam and be taken at face value if the Security
Council can't present a united face. Quite simply Saddam can't
make choices he isn't given.
In the game theory example I outlined in an earlier post I said
Bush should approach Chirac as a first step and ask him to
articulate a general standard of proof that the security council
(including France as a permanent member could use as the
hurdle that needs to be cleared to get a go to war decision on
any particular case). Bush seems to have opted instead to try
and get a new resolution up without going directly to Chirac.
This seems like a suboptimal move to me. If Bush prepares a
role for Chirac as the one that stood up to the US despite
overwhelming pressure to fold he is likely to find he is throwing
brear rabbit into the briar patch. The more Bush goes after
Chirac and Chirac holds out the tougher and more principled
Chirac looks. In actual fact the Security Council *needs* a
practical standard of proof as a general principle (irrespective
of the particulars of Iraq) in order to carry out its Article 1
mandate of maintaining international peace and security
effectively. If the Security Council won't or can't accept
the responsibility for maintaining security (including threats
of the new kind) then it is not fulfilling its raison detre. And if
Chirac did not come up with a standard when publicly asked
to do so Chirac would loose any claim to the high moral
ground and Bush would be justified in treating the Security
Council with any such impractical a permanent member with
veto powers on it as unworkable. And the world could be
shown that it was Chirac not Bush that failed to rise to the
challenge of the moment.
But it *is* Bush's move and if he chooses to move badly or
fails to move optimally his move does determine the board
everyone else gets to play on. Right now it looks to me
that Bush is fiddling with the wrong "chess piece". Looks like
he's going to try and further isolate France. That's a
suboptimal move and Bush not Chirac would be responsible
for it. The suboptimal move like poor generalship hurts all
sides more.
- Brett
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