From: Brett Paatsch (paatschb@ocean.com.au)
Date: Fri Feb 21 2003 - 01:54:10 MST
Hi Extropes,
I've been trying to come up with a game theoric solution to a
hypothetical problem that has the manifestations of the Iraq crisis.
I'm not sure I've actually got it, but I entertained myself for a while
and there may be some merit in it. I had intended to develop the
solution to a Saddam's-regime-replaced with-no-life-lost-at-all-
point but,... well there just wasn't enough room in the margin. So
this goes only to first base. I think it cracks the stand-off caused
by there being no standard against which to test the we-need-to
-go-to-war-on-this-occasion thesis.
(I imagine the "solution" should be read as thought it were a fairy
story and then the question could be asked - so why couldn't this
work in reality if everyone else on the planet also read it.
I'm intrigued by the observation that Axelrod found that he could
teach tit-for-tat to gamers playing iterative prisoners dilemma and
that despite the fact that it was public even those who knew that
the strategy could not beat it.
-------(Let the fairy story begin and THEN lets test it for truth)--
Although nations are aggregates of multiple decision makers, in all
countries, ultimately, *the* decision is made by one person.
Agents who get to decide:
"Rogue leader" as per 1441
------------------------
Iraq: Saddam Hussein.
-------------------------
------------------------
USA: George W Bush
France: Jacques Chirac
UK: Tony Blair
Russian Federation: Vladimir Putin
China: Li Peng
temp-sec-council-m-1 Angolan-head-honcho
temp-sec-council-m-2 Bulgarian-head-honcho
temp-sec-council-m-3 Cameroonian-head-honcho
temp-sec-council-m-4 Chilian-head-honcho
temp-sec-council-m-5 German-head-honcho
temp-sec-council-m-6 Guinean-head-honcho
temp-sec-council-m-7 Mexican-head-honcho
temp-sec-council-m-8 Pakistian-head-honcho
temp-sec-council-m-9 Spanish-head-honch
temp-sec-council-m-10 Syrian-head-honcho
-----------------------
The Iraq Crisis can be seen as an instance of a multi-player game
where one player Bush of the United States has "the move". Bush
has "the move" because he has his military in place and can exercise
the option to use it or to postpone using it for as many increments
of time as he chooses. Bush also has "the move" because any move
any other player makes can be safely ignored by Bush until he makes
a move but the converse is not true. There are pressures on Bush (an
elected leader) both not to move-too-soon and not to delay-too-long.
Nonetheless, for now, Bush does have "the move" and in having
"the-move" he has the power to put propositions to other decision
makers and to be seen to do so if he so chooses.
---- Once this game theoric solution becomes common knowledge, Hussein essentially has no moves other than to choose self destruction or survival. Once this game theoric solution becomes common knowledge, Chirac has no moves other than to-ignominy or to-non-ignominy (which could include some credit and fame). Once this game theoric solution becomes common knowledge, Bush has no moves other than to-ignominy or to-non-ignominy (which could include some credit and fame). Bush to move first (and win resoundingly if he makes no error) Bush to approach Chirac publicly. Bush to Chirac. "We don't currently have a standard of proof for determining the basis on which the Security Council should go to war and clearly we need one. Please propose a standard." Then Chirac has the move. (Chirac also to win if he makes no error). (Chirac then must propose a practical standard - for example something like "proof-beyond-all-reasonable doubt" but not "proof- beyond-all-shadow-of-a-doubt" is used in murder trials. A similar practical standard is needed for the Security Council to be able to make the decision to go to war or else the lack of a practical standard will make it impossible for the Security Council to make its decisions against it, and, as a consequence the Security Council will not be able to fulfil its purpose to maintain international security and it will not be able to do this because Chirac could not come up with a standard which was a necessary first step. When history called on him Chirac will either answer the call or be judged as having failed to do so henceforth and forever). So Chirac produces a standard or he is shown to not produce a standard and the French position as a permanent member of the Security Council is shown to be inept at best and obstructionist at worse - in either case the failure of the Security Council will not be Bush's failure-to-try it will be Chirac's public failure-to-rise-to-the -occasion, and so, with a clear conscience Bush may deem the Security Council unable to perform its duty and he must then withdraw from the UN Charter and act unilaterally with a coalition of the willing and Chirac, not he, will be responsible for the failure of the Security Council and the United Nations. And Chirac will be seen to be responsible by the rest of the world. So Chirac (choosing the win path) will produce a general practical standard for the Security Council against which particular cases can be used by Security Council members as the basis for determining whether or not there is sufficient grounds for the Security Council to authorise a war to remove the head of a Nation state. (And will a few extra downstream details everyone lives after the crisis). ------------------
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