From: Lee Corbin (lcorbin@tsoft.com)
Date: Wed Feb 12 2003 - 00:15:57 MST
Avatar posts, IMO, an eloquent piece which I reproduce below
in its entirety.
But at one point diverges in three different directions with
> Personally I see continuous broadcast linkage as an option,
> but uploading as a great fallacy equal to that of belief
> in a soul.
Unlike your great previous remarks, this doesn't seem to follow
from anything. What are your reasons for rejecting uploading?
(And we better be sure of what we mean. By "uploading" most
people here, I think, mean the creation of a computer program
or some other kind of non-biologic entity that would initially
have the same or equivalent subjective experiences as the original.
By "equivalent", I mean to allow that my experiences last month
are just as representative of me as my experiences today.)
> Tipler's quantum splitting is understandable to me but there
> seems to be no evidence of a soul.
Yes; but this juxtaposition seems to indicate that you connect
*uploading* with *Tipler*. Tipler's Omega point in effect does
upload everyone (as I have characterized "upload" above), but
many kinds of uploading are possible for us long before the
Omega Point is reached (if ever it is reached).
> Atomic level near-duplicates of me would have to mourn
> the permanent death of their near-twin or parent.
I want to know why you do not consider your present atomic
configuration to be a near-duplicate of your state yesterday.
> Uploading is merely childbirth with your parent's memories attached.
Of course, I see that differently.
> In this sense it would be unethical to create a new being
> without seeking consent to insert memories of the parent.
> Similarly, if reincarnation were possible it would
> be unethical to insert memories into the developing fetus.
And this is the third divergence that you've gone off on
(which is fine). But a fetus has no memories. Therefore
it will acquire at random new memories from its random
experiences. (We must consider experiences of a newborn
in a highly emphemeralized world of the 21st century to
be quite random---they are subject to fluctuations caused
by millions of unpredictable people.)
What makes new random memories preferable to the old?
Reminiscent of the way that many on this list highly
value the memories and experiences of 85 year olds,
your seem to be claiming that null memories are
preferable to an 85 year old's, or at least that
the {destruction of 85-year-old's memories + insertion
of new random memories} is to you preferable to a
continuation of the 85-year-old's experiences.
Lee
> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-extropians@extropy.org
> [mailto:owner-extropians@extropy.org]On Behalf Of avatar
> Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2003 10:19 PM
> To: extropians@extropy.org
> Subject: Re: Where the I is
>
>
> > > Is a cloud an "illusion"? Is something that is constantly
> > > shifting for that reason "illusion"? If so, then what does it
> > > matter? Matter itself is consistently shifting at the
> > > fundamental level.
>
> Our forthcoming control of our neural patterning will mean that
> we can choose to keep memories or thought types subject only
> to the limits of our storage capabilities and control capabilities.
> These would seem to be under current understanding about
> 200 million times the current level, more if augmentation is
> greater or biological componentry is replaced. Currently our
> neurons and their firing pattern do change and some die, but
> generically they do not regrow, nor disappear when we sleep, so
> continuity is a principle. Change, then, is interlinked with
> continuity currently (there are principles at work, directions).
> In the future we will be able to choose these. Those who adopt
> stasis scenarios are making a valid choice, although whether this
> can be adhered to over scales of over 10-100 billion years is yet to be
> determined (even with external memory sources).
>
> The self is informed by the actions of others. We know this from
> studies of animals raised without contact. The self exists neurologically,
> which we know from the effects of brain defects.
>
> Fused twins who brains are partially fused still do not share much even
> at the motor-sensory level, from my readings. Therefore the sense of self
> is linked to the map of the brain as it stands. To interlink the sense of
> self with another individual will require specially designed interfacing and
> rewiring of the brain. Interlinking of the senses is another matter.
> However,
> our sense of self is lodged somewhere in the architecture of our brains, and
> in a lesser sense in some other species. Possibly it is a combination of
> generic facillities, some form of "opening" between compartments of the
> brain and specialized centres.
>
> Personally emotionally I see the self as informed by the actions of others,
> surrounded by an egoshield with a subconscious and superconscious
> (altruistic level).
>
> Brain design indicates different levels of evolutionary development present
> in the brain. In this sense, an additional "layer" could be nanofilaments of
> computronium and also molecular supercomputers/cell repair machines inside
> each neuron/dendrite.
>
> Pesonally I see continuous broadcast linkage as an option, but uploading as
> a great fallacy equal to that of belief in a soul. Tipler's quantum
> splitting is
> understandable to me but there seems to be no evidence of a soul. I would
> of course create a soul if that were possible. But in the absence of it or
> proof of Tipler I would never upload. Atomic level near-duplicates of me
> would have to mourn the permanent death of their near-twin or parent.
> Uploading is merely childbirth with your parent's memories attached. In this
> sense it would be unethical to create a new being without seeking consent to
> insert memories of the parent. Similarly, if reinacarnation were possible it
> would
> be unethical to insert memories into the developing fetus.
>
> This is something I haven't fully appreciated before. New beings, whether
> human
> or silicon-based or whatever, deserve to have the capacity to self-boost and
> free
> will present, at least upon reaching maturation within fairly defined
> limits, and also
> deserve to have the option of accepting or rejecting memories. The issue of
> "instincts"
> is there of course, and in the world of designer brains this is a debate
> (see Greg Egan).
> Nonetheless the rights of the child do seem to argue against many versions
> of uploading
> in fiction.
>
> Avatar
>
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