From: Jef Allbright (jef@jefallbright.net)
Date: Thu Feb 06 2003 - 09:09:47 MST
So much anthropomorphizing:
It all depends on the context within which you are making your comparisons.
The sense of self is an illusion. Science has begun to show that our own
sense of self, which seems to us continuous and central, and -- important --
is actually a result of multiple asynchronous fed-back processes. One
emergent characteristic of these processes is what we think of as
consciousness or self-awareness. What even most technophiles don't realize
is that this sense of self is under constant revision, with memories lost,
and sometimes replaced with various degrees of inaccuracy, emotions
changing, and even "processing capability" changing all the time. The sense
of self is an illusion.
What I find strange is that many people would generally agree with the above
paragraph, but then continue to think that preservation of this illusionary
"self" is an all-important goal.
Philosophically-thinking (as opposed to evolutionarily-based
self-preservation thinking) perhaps we should value and promote the
"extropy" of an individual. To value the knowledge and processes that lead
to greater growth, greater knowledge, greater "intelligence", with little
regard, indeed perhaps a sense of "good riddance", to the clinging notion of
self.
This leads to the "eighth level of identity" which I've suggested in
relation to Lee Corbin's seven levels.
On this basis, I strongly disagree with Lee's assertion that the life of an
85-year old is less valuable than that of a 15-year old. In extropic terms,
I think carrying on the 85 year-old knowledge base (given the means to do
that) is much more valuable. In evolutionary-based terms, of course, it
feels right to value the 15-year old who can better carry on the genetic
legacy.
[further comments interspersed below]
Lee Corbin wrote:
> Max writes
>
>> If there is no soul, as I am convinced. And if uploading is
>> possible, as I am convinced, then the I/mind is just the
>> calculations taking place inside the brain. It is not the brain
>> itself.
I would suggest it's more useful to think of the "I/mind" as one *result* of
the calculation process taking place primarily in the brain.
>
> Yes, I would say that that is the more accurate way of speaking,
> but people (that we would agree with) can hardly be blamed for
> saying that computers feel or act when they mean the programs
> in them.
>
>> Well this has been obvious for me for a long time. But what freaked
>> me out a bit, is that it is not the flesh that has conscience but the
>> 'calculations' that is done in the flesh. And the flesh is only the
>> interface that allows us to experience the world.
What is this "us" you speak of, Human? It is confusing to think that
somehow "you" are separate from "the world".
>
> Yes.
>
>> And it is pretty hard to imagine mathematics that is self aware, but
>> that must be the consequence.
It's a stretch to say that mathematics can be self aware. It might be more
useful to say that self-awareness is an emergent property of certain
information-processing systems, which can be described by mathematics.
>
> Well, I don't go that far. We pious platonists believe (in the
> very worst way that Brett Paatsch describes) that the mathematical
> entities such as perfect triangles,
Strange to *believe* in the existence of perfect triangles, when not even a
perfect straight line can be shown to exist anywhere in the physical
universe. Sounds like a good example of an imperfect, but working,
hypothesis to me.
the number seventeen, and all
> other mathematical ideas exist in a timeless platonic space; less
> figuratively and more concretely I describe this as a set of real
> constraints on possibilities in physical space. (For example,
> certain physical objects (computers) when set to methodically
> detonate a bomb when they find solutions for x^n + y^n = z^n
> for integers greater than two, will, it turns out, never explode.)
>
>
> Not sure that I understand you here.
>
>> So the amusing thing is that, given enough time, it should be
>> possible to run a program with a pencil, on a piece paper, that has
>> intelligence and conscience. If you stop writing the life ends and
>> you kill your 'creature'.
What is this "life" you speak of, Human? To make sense of this, you can
only refer to information processing. If the program is written such that it
has the feedback loops we call self-awareness, then it can be said to be
conscious, without implying anything mystical. Implying that something dies
when the program stops running implies that there was something additional
there that "died". That sense of self "dying" is the illusion I mentioned
earlier. It's just a program running. There is no "self" to die (in the
larger context.)
(I understand what is conventionally meant by "self", I live with this
illusion constantly *myself*, but we're seeing enough cracks in this theory
now, and understand enough of it's evolutionary basis, that I'm suggesting
we start getting used to a broader view, beyond personal identity (beyond
Lee's level 7)).
- Jef
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