From: Robert J. Bradbury (bradbury@aeiveos.com)
Date: Thu Jan 23 2003 - 18:43:11 MST
Greg has, in his usual style, said little and spoken volumes.
(Side note to Greg -- not that I'm in any doubt that you
could not speak more but I'm relatively certain that you
have developed an ability to "cut to the chase".)
> Basically, the
> idea is that the Cold War, with its objectives fixed over a half
> century, allowed U.S. forces to evolve into heavy, lumbering,
> overly-complex monstrosities whose clumsiness place an extreme limit on
> policy options.
I do not think that U.S. forces currently have quite the inertia that
this statement would suggest.
Instead I would suggest that the U.S. is still adapting to the lessons
of the Vietnam War. If one engages with a "matched" force one is
likely to suffer losses. If one engages with an overwhelming force
then it isn't a conversation worth engaging in. The U.S. (with a
population of 280+ million people) vs. Iraq (with 24 million people)
isn't even a serious contest. One wonders how the general population
of Iraq can even begin to believe there is some hope for success.
Any rational person would be attempting to find a path for negotiation.
The difference between strategy of the Vietnam War and the Gulf War
seems to suggest we (the U.S.) understand this distinction and are
unlikely to make the mistake (of using insufficient forces) again in the
nearest future.
Not that I think this is a good idea of how to resolve differences
in the long run (one can only speculate about the power/population of
India & China and what might happen when they start to throw their
weight around) or how one engages with a power that may have nuclear
weapons (e.g. North Korea). But for the current situation of the U.S.
vs. almost any North African or Middle Eastern country it is a reasonable
perspective.
> The pace and texture of a similar conflict will look
> very different in ten years: A U.S. president will have more options and
> will be able to be both strong and flexible, something that isn't really
> possible now.
I agree with this to a certain extent. It seems likely to me that
the option will be "off Saddam" or "move a few hundred thousand troops
into battleground preparation areas". It doesn't take rocket science
to know which is cheaper and once this happens once or twice one isn't
going to find a lot of generals willing step into the positions formerly
occupied by individuals like Saddam. A "transparent" society eliminates
dictators and their power base unless they have offsetting technology.
(With Iraq vs. the U.S. this isn't even a question worth discussing).
> In fact, one can see the foreign policy contrast between
> the Clinton and Bush II years as being characterized as two different
> choices in a binary dilemma: strong OR flexible.
The point would be that in ten years it isn't necessary to be "strong"
*or* "flexible". If a leader misbehaves simply get rid of them.
It *is* so much more extropic than going to war.
Greg's post was, as always, insightful. I think, however, he may need
to expand his framework beyond a simple militaristic analysis.
:-)
R.
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