Re: Ethics

Sean Hastings (whysean@earthlink.net)
Tue, 17 Dec 1996 15:56:30 -0600

Anders Sandberg wrote:
>
> On Tue, 17 Dec 1996, Guru George wrote:
>
> > Because as TIT FOR TAT shows, it is objectively the
> > case that co-operation wins in the end, therefore these traits will
> > be selected for, both genetically and culturally.
>
> Remember that a population of TIT FOR TAT is not stable in the long run if
> mutations and evolution occurs, defectors appear and gain great temporary
> benefits of the overly kind population, which then collapses. And after a
> while nice strategies emerge, and the cycle begins anew...
>

Can you point me to your source for this, Anders? I thought that TIT FOR
TAT held its own in pools with more hostile, and nicer strategies, even
where no memory was allowed between iterations.

It never loses to a hostile strategy unless the game length is a known
quantity, and it always does better against another friendly strategy
than two hostile strategies do against each other.

It was my understanding that nice and hostile strategies fluctuated
under mutation, as the favored ESS fluctuated, but that fair strategies
like TIT FOR TAT were very stable.

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