On Sat, 14 Dec 1996, Eliezer Yudkowsky wrote:
> I am sentient: I know this via "Cogito ergo sum."
Well, you know that *someone*, or *something* is cogitating.
> Those configurations of quarks that my antiquated cognitive architecture
> has designated as discrete objects called "cows" are no more alive than
> my computer or one of those motorized toy cars that babies think are
> alive because they move.
Hmm, what about:
"Those configurations of quarks that my antiquated cognitive architecture
has designated as discrete objects called "humans" are no more alive than
my computer or one of those motorized toy cars that babies think are
alive because they move."
The problem of other minds (does anybody but me have consciousness, or do
they just mimic it?) is IMHO unsolvable, and the minimalist solution
(solipsism) tends to be rather pointless. One simply has to decide on an
useful interpretation. As Malcolm McMahon wrote:
To treat something as conscious when it turns out not to be is a
little foolish.
To treat something as not consious when it turns out to be is an
ethical outrage.
So the time will come when we must give the benefit of the doubt.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Anders Sandberg Towards Ascension!
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