Re: Uploading

Michael Lorrey (retroman@tpk.net)
Mon, 04 Nov 1996 21:57:27 -0500


Hal Finney wrote:
>
> From: Chris Hind <chind@juno.com>
> > Probably most people will go the way of the gradual
> > incremental upload due to the fact that people are already thinking about
> > designing augmentation tools (ie. genetic augmentations for when
> > genengineering improves, and chips such as British Telecom's vision
> > recording chip).
>
> OK, supposing that most people do gradually, incrementally upload.
> What happens then? When you are a computer program running in machine 1,
> and you have an opportunity to shut down and start up (where you left
> off) in roomier machine 2, will you take it? Or will you insist on
> "gradually, incrementally" moving to machine 2, with first one line of
> code, and then another, moving over?
>
> What if you have the option to keep running in machine 1 and also start
> up in machine 2? Are you going to take it, or would you feel better if
> your machine 1 program was stopped when the machine 2 program started?
>
> Will the machine 2 program be the same "you" as when you were the machine
> 1 program, or is it a different program that just thinks it's "you"?
>
> I find that when I think of myself as a program in this way, I am
> inclined to believe that my identity is preserved across these kinds
> of interruptions and copies. This leads me to conclude that the same
> thing is true about copies which span meat and machine.
>
> Hal

#1 - Once you are uploaded, an incremental duplication could take
nanoseconds. Maintaining simultaneous existences would simply be a
virtual method of reproduction, in a budding sort of way, while gradual
crossover to new hardware, even if one wished to remain in the same
hardware, would be a method of maintaining the integrity of the self.
Budding is simply making more selves. As nanotech and space migration
increase the resource base, then transhumans can purchase, build,
whatever, the hardware needed to "house" budded selves. As the
technology advances, virtual reproduction in a biological sexual sense
(i.e. melding two genotypes) would create whole new mixtures of
transhuman templates, rather than just copies of old ones.

Becoming uploaded will enable an entity to reproduce in whatever manner
is most beneficial to the entity at the point in time that the entity
chooses to reproduce.

maybe it's still the little Catholic kid inside me, but I still think
that to not maintain the body/mind awareness through the transfer would
break some sort of link. Even though a flash loaded mind may "think" its
me, I still have doubts. THe human mind runs on too slow a baud rate, in
terms of impulse transfer rate, and even the best silicon/biological
interface will be a tight squeeze for a whole mind at once.

Mike