> hanson@hss.caltech.edu (Robin Hanson) writes:
> >I will present a paper of mine which has a model which explains why
> >rational regulators would ban products for rational consumers, rather
> >than to label them. I explain such behavior as a commitment failure;
> >both sides would rather commit to no such bans, but once bans are
> >possible, regulators often choose them in the game-theoretic
> >equilibrium, since not banning would be taken as an endorsement of
> >product quality.
>
> Why are you trying to argue that regulators would rather avoid such
> bans? My impression is that most people find it hard to hold beliefs
> that their work is harming people, and that it is much easier to
> assume that regulatory agencies attract mainly those workers who
> are inclined to believe that such bans are good.
Why ignore the revolving door between the regulated and the
regulators?
Why ignore that regulations are used to covertly cartelize an
industry? and further used to covertly pick winners and losers
independent of the market! Why be naive?
Some think the rather arbitrary actions of the FDA regarding
artificial sweetners was a case in point.
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