From: "John Clark" <jonkc@worldnet.att.net> To: <extropians@extropy.com> Subject: Re: SOC: As goes Kansas...(evolution) Date sent: Sun, 10 Oct 1999 01:02:27 -0400 Send reply to: extropians@extropy.com
> Robert Owen <rowen@technologist.com> Wrote:
>
> >If we assume the being of a "hypertranscendental" or "super-
> >natural" object whose properties are omniscence, omnipresence,
> >and omnipotence, then I suppose the human dualities of "good-
> >evil", "loving-sadistic" and so on cannot, by definition, have
> >the slightest relevance to the essence of this object. In this
> >sense, Bryan, it is also inappropriate to say "God is Good".
>
> I agree. If good and evil exist independently of God then He has nothing
> to do with morality except that He's supposed to obey moral law just like
> everybody else. He can't be omnipotence either. If good and evil are
> not independent of God then doing good is just a matter of avoiding
> punishment and no loftier than obeying what the Nazi's tell you to do
> if they occupy your country. One must be true if God exists but I've
> found that most people are unhappy with either conclusion, so I don't
> make this argument much anymore, except to Extropians because
> they're not most people.
>
Such a being could not simultaneously be omniscient and
omnipotent. If omnipotent, (s)he/it would have the power to change
the future, and thus could not know it for certain; if omniscient,
(s)he/it would know the future for certain, and therefore could not
change it. Like the mythical irresistible force and immovable
object, these two properties cannot coinhere in a single universe.
Not only that, but omnipresence is equivalent to a lack of
presence, for one can only possess a perspective or point of view
relative to an other, or that which one is not. In the case of
omnipresence, no such other can exist (there not being a place for
such an other), thus there could be nothing upon which an
omnipresence could establish or maintain any perspective. Also,
frames of reference can only exist in multiples; there must be at
least two to establish the differential context necessary for
mutually definitional comparison and contrast. Omnipresence
lacks such referential grounding.
>
> John K Clark jonkc@att.net
>
>
>
>