hmm...
equaly true, it is you and is not you.
If my individuality could be defined as my collection of experiences
IMHO the copy is mostly me immediately after the copy process, and becomes
less me as time goes on.
also: while I'm sleeping I have a vague, dark, sort of continuity, I always
wake up knowing about how long I have slept w/o external cues, I'm in a self
/ environment monitoring state, while enjoying spikes of phantasmagoric
reverie.
I do strive to meditate in deep levels of brain activity, with amplitudes in
theta and approaching delta, and in sleep I tend to remain somewhat aware
throughout the night, lucid dreaming is a nice side benefit.
are people now alive that have been frozen embryos, that have ceased all
brain activity, the same after they are thawed out?
Or maybe I'm ignorant of such proceses *shrug*
----- Original Message -----
From: "Dickey, Michael F" <michael_f_dickey@groton.pfizer.com>
To: <extropians@extropy.org>
Sent: Wednesday, December 12, 2001 1:45 PM
Subject: Sincere Questions on Identity
: Sincerely, I hate to bring this subject up again, but it has been running
: through my mind. It seems a good number of the people on this list
support
: the assertion that a copy is 'you'. I have been taking the stance (along
: with a minority it appears) that a copy is not you, but it is a copy. I
: consider everyone I have interacted with and read posts from on this forum
: very intelligent, and the lack of interest in this subject or responding
to
: my arguments suggest, to me at least, that perhaps my stance is wrong. If
: so many well learned people do not consider the question important enough
to
: reply to, then perhaps they know something that I do not. Because this is
: an issue of great importance to me (a matter of life and death, so to
speak)
: I was wondering if, perhaps, someone can enlighten me on the fallacies of
my
: argument. It is vitally important for me that I feel comfortable in the
: manner in which I may end up surviving bodily death and that hopefully it
: will indeed be 'me' and not a copy of me. But people on this list feel
that
: a 'copy' of me is actually indistinguishable from me, or IS me. I would
: like to learn as much as I can about this position, as I am striving to
: figure out what the most likely and simplest explanation for observed
: phenomena is. If the heart of this argument can be relayed to me, perhaps
I
: will be able to feel solace in a copy of me surviving. Thanks for your
: input.
:
: So far, the only arguments I have identified that argues against the
: 'continuity of consciousness' argument is the 'how do I know it hasn't
: happened already' form and the 'you aren't made of the atoms you were made
: of before'
:
: --------------------------------
:
: For some example of the 'How do you know argument' from responses to my
: comments...
:
: "I, for one, cannot see the slightest value in "continuity of
: consciousness", whatever that is. How is being destroyed and restored
: from a backup any different from the perfectly ordinary experience of
taking
: a whack on the head a waking up a few minutes later?"
:
: "Its *you* as of the time of the backup if the backup and restoration
: methods are completely loss less. Any other perspective is to argue
: "consciousness" has some basis in non-physical phenomena."
:
: "Your consciousness continues just like it would if you got bumped on the
: head and "forgot" the last three days of your life"
:
: "The continuity of consciousness view seems to be held by at least some
: transhumanists. How this view can be held when many people have clearly
: lived through a period of complete cessation of neural activity I don't
: know."
:
: "how can you be sure that you don't die every night when you go to sleep
and
: that the conscious being who awakes the next morning is not a copy with
the
: same memories?
:
: "If you were copied and murdered last night would you feel one bit
different
: today?"
:
: I feel I have to delve into philosophy of science a little bit here.
: Getting copied in a destructive manner is different from getting whacked
on
: the head and waking up a few minutes later in a few key areas 1) getting
: whacked on the head does not destroy you 2) and the mechanism that houses
: your consciousness never changes. There is no reason to suspect that I am
a
: different person (i.e. a copy) after getting whacked on the head because
: there is no evidence suggesting that is the case.
:
: I would argue that anything suggesting a continuity of consciousness
between
: an original and a copy necessarily implies that there is some supernatural
: element to consciousness, unless you acknowledge that the copy is a
: different being. Otherwise some common perceptual sense must hop from
: original to copy, that would be unreasonable to assume scientifically.
:
: Living through a session of complete neural cessation also does not
involve
: the changing of the physical mechanism housing the consciousness. It is
: pretty obvious that going to sleep and waking up or experiencing a short
: period of being clinically dead and then revived is a far cry from
: physically incinerating a body and every atom and molecule and then
: constructing an identical copy of it, as one scenario involves destruction
: of some kind, and the other does not. How the view that these two
scenarios
: are indistinguishable can be held by a rational scientifically minded
person
: I don't know.
:
: I can be reasonable sure that when I go to sleep at night I don't die for
a
: few reasons 1) Hooking me up to any kind of machine that measures brain
: activity would never measure any absolute cessation in activity 2) My mind
: and or body is not observed, on a nightly basis, to violently disappear in
a
: great flash of energy and the to suddenly reappear a few moments later in
: another flash of energy 3) The molecules and atoms that make up my mind
and
: house my consciousness are never observed to change form or shape during
the
: course of the evening. In short, if all the evidence that exists suggest
: that I am the same person, physically and psychically, when I went to
sleep,
: it is reasonable and scientific to assume that I am the same person that
: wakes up.
:
: I can also be reasonably sure that I was not murdered last night for the
: same reasons above, in addition to the fact that no evidence suggest any
: sort of violent struggle or murder, e.g. brains and blood splattered all
: over the wall, with DNA that matches mine.
:
: To elaborate a little further, there is a principle in science referred to
: as Occam's Razor, that is 'The simplest explanation tends to be the
correct
: one' or it is assumed to be the correct one depending on your
: interpretation. A prime example is the question of the existence of the
: Universe. If one is to say that the universe exists and the reason for
that
: is that God created the universe, the next question obviously is who
created
: god. Only three logical possibilities exist, 1) that god created himself,
: 2) that he was created by another god or 3) that he was always there. If
: one presumes that the universe must have been created because it is so
: complex, then it would follow that any being that created the universe
must
: be pretty complex as well to create such a complex thing. Yet this just
: moves the goal post back, who created this more complex being? If you
: assume that God created itself or was always there, then it is just
: reasonable to assume that the universe created itself or was always there,
: in fact, once you add an arbitrary concept when attempting to explain
: something (the presence of the universe) then it makes no difference to
add
: an infinite number of them. For example, saying the Universe was created
by
: God is functionally no different then saying the universe was created by
God
: who was created by another god who was created by a giant turtle who was
: created by a giant robot who was created by a super alien ad infanitum.
: There is no evidence to distinguish these lines of reasoning, the only
line
: of reasoning that is scientifically supported is that the Universe exists,
: and does not require a supernatural source.
:
: Similarly, saying that while you sleep it is possible you were destroyed,
: copied, and resurrected is adding arbitrary entities to an observed
: situation. If observed one would find that I sleep through the night,
: undisturbed, no murders, no transporters, no spontaneous flashes of energy
: associated with my body vaporizing. Since none of these things can be
: observed to occur, arguing that they could have because you cant prove
other
: wise is anti scientific, as you can not prove a negative, and these
: occurrences are arbitrary entities not based in any factual observations.
:
: Conversely, should I be destroyed, copied, then resurrected, the instances
: could indeed be observed. The destroying, the massive room sized scanner
: moving and spinning around my head, and the room sized molecular
: construction system creating a copy of me.
:
: ---------------------------------
:
: The 'you are always changing' argument, example from responses to my
post...
:
: "What exactly do you mean by "The Original" anyway, all your atoms are in
a
: constant state of flux, you really aren't the man you were a year ago."
:
: As I pointed out in my original response to this, replacing one atom at a
: time is far different from replacing all atoms at once. The actual
process
: the brain goes through ends up slowly replacing your atoms and molecules
: over a vast length of time, any particular atom could remain in the system
: for years on end. Comparing this slow repairing and modifying process
with
: a rapid total destruction of a system is logically fallacious. The RATE
of
: the replacement is the key difference. My atoms are replaced over a wide
: spanse of time, and at any given time the majority of the physiological
: mechanism that makes up my brain and my consciousness is unaffected. If
you
: compare the difference between replacing one neuron at a time with a
: hardware equivalent vs. replacing ALL of them through a destructive
scanning
: method, it becomes obvious that there is quite a functional difference
: between then two. It seems unreasonable to think replacing ONE neuron of
: 100 billion billion neurons has the same effect as replacing 100 billion
: billion neurons while destroying the original neurons.
:
: ---------------------------------
:
: Harvey, in response to my comments later says when summing up the
arguments
:
: "The argument finally boils down, in my opinion, to semantics. Given the
: definition of identity that claims the two copies are separate, we can
prove
: that the two copies are separate. Given the definition of identity that
: claims all copies are the same individual, we can prove that all copies
are
: the same individual."
:
: Anders says
:
: "The problem is that we end up in semantics while really trying to say
: something relevant about selfhood."
:
: This sounds like circular reasoning to me, that is, assuming the
conclusion
: as a premise. If we look at the simplest explanation that the evidence
: points to, it is reasonable to assume (and scientific) that you do not die
: and get copied while you sleep, and that you are the same person after
being
: whacked on the head. I do not see it as a semantics argument, as we are
not
: arguing about the definition of what it means to be me. We are making an
: observational claim that if you were to copy my neural pattern and
recreate
: it with a new set of atoms and molecules, that 'person' which is both a
: neural pattern and a group of molecules exists independently from me, and
I
: am not aware of its thoughts and hopes and dreams, and it is not aware of
: mine.
:
:
: Damien later says
:
: "This *doesn't* mean their fallible sense of conviction is *valid*, any
more
: than a surviving soldier's faith in God supports the existence of this
: imaginary contrivance--although in both cases, I'm sure the experience
would
: `confirm' the prejudice."
:
: Important point to emphasize, no matter how strongly one believes
something
: to be true, whether a copy is me or whether a copy is not, it has no
bearing
: upon reality and the way the world actually works. In fact, to determine
: the way the world works, we must examine it through tests and experiments.
: If I am most concerned with myself surviving physical death, I should be
: concerned with the way the universe actually works. A simple thought
: experiment seems to me reasonable enough to prove that a copy is not me,
as
: I mentioned before, if a copy is made with a passive scanning system and
we
: are both revived, do we perceive the same thing? If my copy is brought to
: another room, can I see what it sees? If so, I would concur that we are
the
: same individual being, and that I would have had continuity of
consciousness
: had I not been revived, but this indeed would imply some sort of
: supernatural link between the entities. But since I probably could not
see
: what he sees or experience what he experiences, it is certainly reasonable
: to assume that he is NOT me, and that I would have had no continuity
: consciousness, and that he is a copy.
:
: Even Max acknowledges this when he says
:
: "Parfitians (myself included) tend to agree with some functionalists and
: disagree with John, saying that an identical copy of me is not me"
:
: Of course, he goes on to downplay the importance of this distinction,
: stating that
:
: "we don't think that identity is what matters. What matters is
psychological
: connectedness and continuity."
:
: It may not matter to him, directly, if he survives bodily death in a
: continous manner of awareness, but it would matter to me.
:
: Now, the point must be conceded that if ones top priority was to bring the
: things they would have brought into the world in, then a copy will
certainly
: suffice. I would like to think that I can bring something into the world
: from my existence, so having a copy would be preferable over no copy, but
it
: still is not *me* as far as the evidence suggests and I would not
experience
: a continuity of consciousness and for all intents and purposes could be
: considered dead. I would place the highest priority on my continuity of
: consciousness, followed closely by a copy being brought into existence.
: But, I think, in this case, if reality can not prove a stance either way,
it
: would be best to err on the side of caution.
:
: ---------------------------------
:
: Some other comments I received...
:
: "I believe that if the copy has all your thoughts and experiences, and a
: continuity of consciousness, then he (not it) feels like " the
: original you" has perceived a waking up sensation. I would say that this
: statement is identical to "the original me perceives a waking up
: sensation".
:
: and...
:
: "I think that if the copy feels continuity between the original you and
: himself, then you wake up and live on. Unfortunately there appears to be
no
: way to establish an operative difference between this position and yours."
:
: I think that the thought experiment I relayed above suggests there is an
: operative difference between these positions. If the premise is that a
copy
: is me, then since I am aware of things I do, and a copy is me, I should be
: aware of the things a copy does. It does not seem likely that this would
be
: the case if this experiment were actually performed. Though I must admit
I
: would be glad if it did turn out this way.
:
: Lee Daniel Crocker suggested that the argument is pointless and it is more
: important to discuss the rights of the copy, stating
:
: "These are actual questions of fact, and concerns to think about. Which of
: the lumps of flesh is "me" is just mental masturbation."
:
: But I must disagree, since this assertion is testable under these
: circumstances. Again, If a copy is me, and I experience the things I do,
: then it follows that I would experience the things a copy does, since that
: copy is me. This is an easily testable phenomena, but I think we can
guess
: what the outcome of the test would be until it is a test that is
: performable.
:
: In conclusion, I am really trying to understand what I am missing in this
: argument, if so many people are so sure the point is irrelevant, what am I
: not realizing?
:
: Given the though experiment outlined ".... If we copied your neural
pattern
: and created a duplicate of it, while still keeping you intact, and woke
you
: both up, what would happen? If we took your copy into another room, would
: you be experiencing subjectively what your copy was? I doubt it.
Therefore
: the copies 'waking up' and continuity of consciousness is different and
: isolated from yours." what would be a good argument discrediting the
: validity of this thought experiment.
:
: Concerned about my well being...
:
: Michael
:
:
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