I confess that I've only briefly skimmed this discussion But, from what
I've read, I suspect some of the disagreement might result from not having
distinguished two senses of identity:
Numerical (or logical) identity and qualitative identity.
I take it that John Clark is saying that two later individuals are both
"you" so long as they are qualitatively identical. I take it that Jason,
Harvey and others are stressing that copies or later divisions of the self
are numerically distinct selves, and so cannot be logically identical to
the earlier (single) self.
If this is part of the disagreement, both sides may not disagree as much as
it seems, since these two views are consistent. I certainly do not believe
that John is suggesting some mysterious non-physical transfer of energy or
information between individuals. My own view (largely inspired by Derek
Parfit in Reasons and Persons) is that if you copy me exactly, both later
Max's (MaxB2001 and MaxC2001 will be continuers or survivors of me
(MaxA2000). We will not share identity in the logical sense, since
transitivity breaks down. But I would regard both the later individuals as
having equally good claims on being continuations of me (MaxA2000), and I
would regard it as true that I (MaxA2001) would have survived as two new
individuals. Logically I (MaxA2000) would not longer exist in 2001, but I
don't think that it is logical identity that matters. What matters is that
there be a continuous chain of psychological continuity and connectedness
over time, and the two later selves would ensure this just as well as my
continuing as a single self.
This might resolve some of the disagreement, but the difficult question of
whether MaxB2001's survival would ameliorate the death of MaxC2001 is more
tricky. My view is that it's a matter of degree. (I seem to disagree with
John here. Or am I misinterpreting what I ready by you, John?) There's no
sharp cut-off line for me. The more recently I backed up my self, the more
comfortable I am with the idea that the revived copy is me (or enough-me).
I don't see a 95% qualitatively identical copy surviving my (MaxA2000)
death as any different from my being cryonically suspended and revived with
95% fidelity.
Most of you already know this, but for those who don't and have the time to
spare, my entire Ph.D. dissertation on this topic from 1994-95) is on my
website. While chapters 3 and 4 have some fun stuff, the relevant material
to this discussion is mostly in Chapter One: Causal Conditions for
Continuity, and Chapter Two: The Terminus of the Self.
http://www.maxmore.com/disscont.htm
Does anyone know how many times this topic has been discussed on the
Extropians list since 1991? :-) Each time usually something new is said.
Strange how we "extrobots" can have such continual and vigorous
intellectual disagreements. :-)
Onward!
Max
---------------------
Max More,
max@maxmore.com or more@extropy.org
www.maxmore.com
President, Extropy Institute. www.extropy.org
Senior Content Architect, ManyWorlds Consulting: www.manyworlds.com
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