Emlyn wrote,
>I agree, absolutely. The bio-brain that you reassembled is a copy, but is a
>me (not the me, although it is it's own the me). The artificial brain,
>however, includes the original stream of consciousness; if it had been
>killed, "I" would experience death. If the copy experienced death, I'd
>probably be sad, but hey, at least it wasn't me.
>
>>From the copy's point of view, it is me. If the "original" died, it'd be
>sad, but it'd get over it. If it died, well, that would be a disaster for
>it.
I think the key question here is how the two copies are connected.
You and I believe that they are not connected at all. Each would
sense its own consciousness, but have no connection with the other
consciousness. Each would have its own self-awareness that would
cover its own copy but not the other copy. In this sense, each is an
individual, just as the original by itself was an individual.
Copying makes more individuals, not a group mind.
-- Harvey Newstrom <HarveyNewstrom.com>
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Mon May 28 2001 - 09:50:35 MDT