Jason Joel Thompson, <jasonjthompson@home.com>, writes:
> To that end (and for the sake of brevity,) I invite you to engage the
> discussion at hand by means of the following question:
>
> Does the initial discrete reality experiencer transition into a new
> substrate upon the creation of a copy?
I think it is helpful to get away from our meat-brain orientation in
looking at these questions. Imagine that you are *already* uploaded
and running as a computer program. (Ignore whether or not you are the
"same" person as the one who was uploaded.)
Now ask, what kinds of changes or transformations to your program would be
permissible in various models of identity? Can the program be suspended
and then resumed? Can it be moved from block to block of memory?
Can portions be swapped out to disk and then brought in as needed?
Can it be suspended, copied to another computer, and then resumed there?
I think this approach frees us from an excessive focus on the particular
characteristics of our brains. It lets us look more abstractly at the
nature of information and how it might be associated with consciousness
and identity.
Hal
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