Re: [UPLOADING] Uploading v2.0

Bryan Moss (bryan.moss@dial.pipex.com)
Sun, 19 Jul 1998 23:30:06 +0100

> John K Clark <johnkc@well.com> wrote:

I'm not sure if you actually think John wrote this or you've just misattributed the message. I'm going to answer your question regardless.

> > I don't if I'm pleased that you understand, or
> > infuriated by the fact that I've been saying
> > the exact same thing all this time!
>
> No you haven't. You said that the walls were
> the same, when you really meant that they look
> similar to the two participants.

I've said they can see the same thing, I've asked you to prove (always in the context of this thought experiment) that they are different, but not once have I said they are the same.

> You said that nobody could prove the walls
> different, when you really meant that the two
> participants in the example would be prevented
> access to the tools to do so.

This entire thread was concerning a confined thought experiment, not once did I apply any of my questions or answer to anything other than the situation in the room. It was you, not me, who decided to post messages stating I had made grand claims about two identical things being one.

> You said that consciousness does not reside in
> the brain, when what you really meant is that it
> doesn't have to remain in the brain.

I think this is something John may have said, I have not said this.

> You said that consciousness does not reside in
> any location, when what you really meant is that
> consciousness is not limited to a single
> location.

John has said this, that consciousness is like a number, or red, and has no location. I agree, but I have not said as such during this debate.

> Every time someone proved you wrong, you
> clarified your position to be different from
> what you originally wrote.

If someone had proved me wrong, I would have been the first to say so. What I have done is attack the same experiment from different angles to try to explain it, rather than just answer a succession one-sided of questions.

> > > They will therefore diverge in thought,
> > > deed, or experience. The two people will
> > > think differently, act differently, or
> > > experience differently. They cannot remain
> > > identical.
> >
> > So if we've established that they will not
> > diverge in thought, deed, or experience, can
> > they act as redundancy?
>
> Read my statement more carefully. Your response
> is a non sequitur.

The statement from you was on exactly the same subject that you had previously said you now understood in your reply to John. Since you were agreeing that in this situation they would not diverge I asked the next question hoping that you might have some consistency of thought.

> I am not the one who is miscommunicating here!

I think I may have confused you by quoting from several different messages.

BM