During one uploading scenario, the uploaded copy is made first and then the original copy is destroyed. Some people think that the destruction of the first copy is murder. Others think it is not as long as there is an identical copy.
What is murder? The deliberate causing of death. What is death? Herein lies the debate.
The former school thinks that the destruction of any viable person is death. Even if there are copies of a person, killing one of the copies is death. Currently, while we only have one body per person, or one copy per person, this definition holds for everybody.
The latter school thinks that the destruction of the last copy of a viable person is death. If there are copies of a person, killing any of the copies is OK as long as a single copy survives. Currently, while we only have one body per person, or one copy per person, this definition holds for everybody.
When we achieve the ability to make identical copies of a person, which defintion should hold? I think this is the question before us. Either defintion is functional and seems universally accepted for now, because both result in the same conclusions. In the future, these theories will diverge in their results and application. How do we choose between them?
The new question is, what is wrong with death and murder? What constitutes this bad thing we call "death" that we are trying to avoid?
I assume that the former school will say that the termination of any living being is a death. That being is determined to be alive if it consciously thinks it is alive. External data are irrelevent to the question of whether someone is alive. The person is inherently alive or dead based on *their own* functioning. If a person is alive, then to terminate its functioning would be death, and an act of murder.
I assume that the latter school will say that termination of any *unique* being is death. That any being that has been copied may be terminated as long as an identical copy still is viable. That being is determined to be alive if it can produce actions or data that are unique and are not exactly reproduceable by another identical copy. In this case, *internal* data are irrelevent to the question of whether someone is alive, and only a comparison to external persons will determine if the person is alive. The person is externally declared to be alive or dead based on *other person's* functioning. If the person is not unique, and an exact copy is alive, then terminating its functioning would not be death or an act of murder.
-- Harvey Newstrom <mailto:harv@gate.net> Author, Engineer, Entrepreneur, <http://www.gate.net/~harv> Consultant, Researcher, Scientist. <ldap://certserver.pgp.com>