[snip]
>Eventually, it seems clear that at some point I will have restricted my
>actions to such an extent that everything not prohibited by contract is
>compulsory by contract. How can I then say that I own myself? I've sold
>my freedom to act for a certain consideration. My point, as you have
>quoted above, is that with the very first promise I make, I no longer
>own myself entirely. Again, ownership being a term-of-art for autonomy.
>
[snip]
But what holds one to one's promises? It isn't some external force, but
one's own will, one's own decision - after all, I *could* break those
promises at any time, if I wanted to.
So one is still autonomous: one still owns oneself, one still controls
oneself, by nature.
One only loses that power if some alien force intrudes on one's control:
and that's what libertarianism has noticed, and emphasises. The *social
* condition of freedom, liberty, is, effectively, mutual forbearance
>from mutual interference with each others' autonomy, with the kind of
exclusive
natural control we *can* have over our minds, bodies and property, to
the extent that we are 'allowed' to by nature's laws and by other people.
Guru George