Robin wrote earlier:
> There is less scope for being "right" in disagreements about values.
> Once we understand what we want, and opponents decide they don't want
> that, there isn't that much more to say to them.
Wei responds:
> People's values seem to be derived from some set of fundamental values,
> and the facts that they believe to be true. So we can convince people
> that we are "right" about values in two ways. The first is to convince
> them of a new set of facts, and the second is to convince them that their
> derived values are not consistent with their fundamental values and their
> beliefs about facts. As an example, if you convince a theist that there
> are no gods, that would probably change a number of his values.
I think Robin's "values" are more like what you are calling "fundamental
values". These would be the core beliefs people have which are relatively
immune to change. Then I think your formula is consistent with Robin's
formulation: given the values (fundamental values) and (believed) facts,
people can come up with a judgement about how attractive the situation is.
Hal
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Mon Oct 02 2000 - 17:37:51 MDT