On Fri, Apr 09, 1999 at 04:56:30PM +0000, Nick Bostrom wrote:
> Couldn't we just say that the rational probabilities in such a case
> are indeterminate? No preferred position, nor the assumption that all
> positions should have the same probability (if there are infinitely
> many observers).
I understand rationality to be in part a constraint on beliefs. When you say "rational probabilities in such a case are indeterminate", do you mean that a rational person can have arbitrary beliefs in such a case (ie rationality places no constraint on such probabilities), or that he should assign "indeterminate" to such probabilities? And if it is the latter, what should he do if he has to make a decision where an indeterminate probability is involved (for example whether or not to accept a bet that has an indeterminate probability of winning)?