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In a message dated 5/14/01 10:56:52 AM, rhanson@gmu.edu writes:

*>As I said in my last message, "I was making a *normative* argument about
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*>rational beliefs, not a descriptive model of actual beliefs." If there
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*>are constraints on what beliefs are rational, then upon discovering
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*>that your beliefs violate those constraints, you should want to change
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*>your beliefs to avoid those violations. This sort of change seems
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*>perfectly rational to me, even if it violates a naive Bayesianism.
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Bayesianism is a certain process for updating beliefs based on evidence.

Maintaining your priors isn't a part of "naive" Bayesianism; it's an

essential part of Bayesianism, period. Change your beliefs any other way and

you're bookable. If your claim is that Bayesians are naive and you have a

better way, fine, but a) that needs justification and b) be upfront about it.

*>>You assume everybody agree on world_state_function/belief_state and
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*>>on probability(belief_state). It's trivial to derive a
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*>>belief-state-independent
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*>>world state function (i.e. a prior) just by averaging
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*>>world_state_function/belief_state
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*>>by probability(belief_state). So you do assume everybody has the same
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*>>uberprior.
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*>
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*>I don't follow you. My short paper http://hanson.gmu.edu/priof.pdf
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*>describes uberpriors as q_i, where the i subscript allows different
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*>people to have different uberpriors. I do not require q_i = q_j.
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I apologize for misreading your assumptions. I knew you had the assumption

of shared uberpriors in there and missed that it wasn't explicit. It's a

consequence of the extremely strong consistency assumption. Your consistency

assumption requires that all possible views be consistent with my view in the

sense that they derive from my uberprior with only the evidence of their own

existence. As I showed, this requires the belief probabilities follow the

distribution function f(A) = cA/(1-A). Beliefs from that distribution follow

your consistency assumption only with an uberprior of 1/(1+c).

Under the more normal assumption that uninformed priors are not highly

informative, the only prior that meets the consistency assumption with my

prior is my prior. So your consistency assumption holds, in effect, that

either a) all beliefs result from highly informative brainstates, reasoning

from a shared uberprior or b) everybody has the same prior. Neither holds

for people. Your consistency assumption could hold only for interactions

between backups of one perfectly rational individual.

If you are maintaining that human beings should commonize priors, you have

demonstrated this is not true if people are Bayesian (given what we know

about people). You've been suggesting that Bayesian humans should coordinate

priors by Bayesian reasoning; but based on your work that has to be modified

to a recomendation that some currently unspecified groups of non-Bayesian

people should coordinate priors by some currently unspecified non-Bayesian

method. Call these unspecified groups and methods "Hansonists" and

"Hansonism". From what you've said in the past Hansonists should be "people

who follow Bayesian inference except that they coordinate priors with other

Hansonists." My best guess for Hansonism is "the procedure that results from

participation in an idea futures market" but I'm less sure of this, since

that's not formally defined.

**Next message:**Lee Corbin: "The Future of Racism"**Previous message:**Harvey Newstrom: "RE: MOVIE: _Pi_"**Maybe in reply to:**Robin Hanson: "Opinions as Evidence: Should Rational Bayesian Agents Commonize Priors"**Next in thread:**Robin Hanson: "Re: Opinions as Evidence: Should Rational Bayesian Agents Commonize Priors"**Reply:**Robin Hanson: "Re: Opinions as Evidence: Should Rational Bayesian Agents Commonize Priors"**Messages sorted by:**[ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]

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