**Next message:**Eliezer S. Yudkowsky: "Re: Risk vs. Payoff (was Re: Alcor on KRON)"**Previous message:**Jim Fehlinger: "Re: Professor set to 'control' wife by cyborg implant"**Next in thread:**CurtAdams@aol.com: "Re: Opinions as Evidence: Should Rational Bayesian Agents Commonize Priors"**Maybe reply:**CurtAdams@aol.com: "Re: Opinions as Evidence: Should Rational Bayesian Agents Commonize Priors"**Maybe reply:**CurtAdams@aol.com: "Re: Opinions as Evidence: Should Rational Bayesian Agents Commonize Priors"**Maybe reply:**hal@finney.org: "Re: Opinions as Evidence: Should Rational Bayesian Agents Commonize Priors"**Maybe reply:**CurtAdams@aol.com: "Re: Opinions as Evidence: Should Rational Bayesian Agents Commonize Priors"**Maybe reply:**CurtAdams@aol.com: "Re: Opinions as Evidence: Should Rational Bayesian Agents Commonize Priors"**Messages sorted by:**[ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]

Curt Adams today offered a derivation purporting to show that if two agents

start with different priors, and then each update their beliefs on the fact

that the other one was assigned the prior they got, then the posteriors of

the two agents will not be the same except under unusual circumstances. I

agree that Curt has in fact show this.

I suspect that Curt thinks that his result contradicts something that I

have said, but I do not see any contradiction. The standard agreeing to

disagree literature starts with agents who have the same priors, and show

that updating on statements of opinions produces common beliefs. I also

have a paper on the causal origins of priors

(http://hanson.gmu.edu/prior.pdf or .ps) which shows how updating on the

fact that you were assigned the prior you got can imply common priors. But

neither of these contradict Curt's derivation.

**Next message:**Eliezer S. Yudkowsky: "Re: Risk vs. Payoff (was Re: Alcor on KRON)"**Previous message:**Jim Fehlinger: "Re: Professor set to 'control' wife by cyborg implant"**Next in thread:**CurtAdams@aol.com: "Re: Opinions as Evidence: Should Rational Bayesian Agents Commonize Priors"**Maybe reply:**CurtAdams@aol.com: "Re: Opinions as Evidence: Should Rational Bayesian Agents Commonize Priors"**Maybe reply:**CurtAdams@aol.com: "Re: Opinions as Evidence: Should Rational Bayesian Agents Commonize Priors"**Maybe reply:**hal@finney.org: "Re: Opinions as Evidence: Should Rational Bayesian Agents Commonize Priors"**Maybe reply:**CurtAdams@aol.com: "Re: Opinions as Evidence: Should Rational Bayesian Agents Commonize Priors"**Maybe reply:**CurtAdams@aol.com: "Re: Opinions as Evidence: Should Rational Bayesian Agents Commonize Priors"**Messages sorted by:**[ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]

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