Robert J. Bradbury, <email@example.com>, writes:
> On Thu, 15 Mar 2001, Nick Bostrom, commenting on my comments wrote:
> > If the beings in the simulations are conscious then their well-being is as
> > ethically important as that of those who are implemented directly in
> > biological brains in the basement universe.
> Hmmmm, this seems to be the "conscious" = valuable, "non-conscious"
> equals not valuable (e.g. a binary state).
I think what Nick means is that it is irrelevant whether you are
dealing with a "simulated" being or a real one. He is not saying that
consciousness is the deciding factor, merely that simulation-vs-real
doesn't matter. If you don't care about a simulation with a certain
level of consciousness, then you shouldn't care about a real being with
that level of consciousness.
The question of what level of consciousness deserves consideration
is independent of this.
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Mon May 28 2001 - 09:59:40 MDT