Continuity of identity, was: Moravec article available

From: Michael S. Lorrey (
Date: Wed May 03 2000 - 09:52:10 MDT

Ken Clements wrote:

> Zero Powers wrote:
> > ... there seems little doubt
> > that, if you find yourself still living 100 years from now chances are that
> > the "you" of 100 years from now will be so different from the "you" of
> > today, that you will agree that the "you" of today is effectively "dead".
> So, what do you upload, when you upload?

What else do you have but the then you? Comparing the old you and the new you is
not possible, unless you can travel in time, at which point the physical fact
that there is a new you and an old you makes you physically two discrete
individuals. Using this to lead into another discussion of flash uploads versus
augmented uploads is not a real argument, specifically because the new you is
different from the old you because of experience of the intervening years, while
a flash upload is different from the old you, and a copy is different from the
old you due to the discontinuity of identity between original and new quantum
wave forms, just as stepping through a spinning wormhole will cause a
discontinuity of identity due to entropic temporal regression.

100 years from now, the old you will not be 'dead' but will be evolved.

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