Re: Arrow's Social Choice Theorem / Borda count

From: Robin Hanson (
Date: Thu Apr 27 2000 - 09:31:36 MDT

At 10:43 PM 4/26/2000 -0700, wrote:
>this URL on Borda counting, ...
>claims Borda is highly manipulable. But it also seems to criticize it for not
>electing the Cordorcet winner, whereas Saari claims that is a false goal.
>Elsewhere I've seen Saari say that anything which will break Borda will break
>any other scheme as well. And there's also this on Borda manipulation:

I never cared that much for Borda counting, but I do like approval
voting, which is intuitive and easy to explain, and
does seems to clearly improve on simple plurality.

For listeners: approval voting is where each voter gets to vote for as many
or few candidates as you want. The winners is the one with the most votes.

Robin Hanson
Asst. Prof. Economics, George Mason University
MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030
703-993-2326 FAX: 703-993-2323

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