Greg Burch writes:
> From our previous discussions my numero uno "hard question" should be
> obvious. I'll try to rephrase it, based on our past dialogue, in as succenct
> a fashion as I can:
> In the context of cognitive automorphism and augmentation, how do you
> distinguish between "parts of a mind" and "a mind", and what moral principles
> should govern the relationship among them?
I second Greg's suggestion as being one of the difficult moral and ethical
questions we will face as we go forward. There is a conflict between
the centralized control necessary for organization and purposeful action,
versus the desire to encourage freedom and independence for all entities.
It's not very apparent now, because the (possibly illusory) unity of
our minds is so different from the interactions when one person coerces
another. But as we move forward these situations will blur and there
will be a continuum of mental architectures between these extremes.
As Greg says, we need to identify moral principles saying which kinds of
mental structures are acceptable and which are not.
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