Date sent: Fri, 11 Feb 2000 20:44:31 -0500
From: Robert Owen <email@example.com>
Subject: Re: Phenomenology
Organization: The Orion Institute
Send reply to: firstname.lastname@example.org
> Joe E Dees wrote:
> > Excerpted from Gurwitsch, Piaget and Recursive Equilibration, by
> > Joe Dees
> > >
> > The phenomenology of perception (wherein all perception is an
> > intending of its perceptual object), was built upon the foundations
> > laid by not only Franz Brentano (PSYCHOLOGY FROM AN
> > EMPIRICAL STANDPOINT, SENSORY AND NOETIC
> > CONSCIOUSNESS), but by his more famous student Edmund
> > Husserl ... - (Dees: how we constitute perceptual objects)
> You discuss this below -- my short answer, by anchoring a
> reversible succession of percepts in the category "substance";
> Kant answers Hume with respect to a "necessary" succession
> by means of the a priori relation "causality".
> > [Dees] Let me try to mediate between the two.
> > Given that the visual field organizes phenomena, and precisely
> > phenomena in focus, it is nevertheless necessary to learn to focus
> > our lenses, to co-ordinate the two lines of sight, to correlate
> > focusing with binocularity (which are not innately linked, for we can
> > separate them), and to synthesize vision with our other perceptual
> > modes.
> It's interesting, Joe, that it seems best simply to accept an equivoca-
> tion in our term "intentionality" --  consciousness is always OF some-
> thing, and  attention is vectored; that is, we "intend" to be aware
> of what we are aware of.
> > Husserl's contributions, of course, are many. The most
> > seminal of these, however, did not originate with Husserl himself,
> > but with his teacher, Franz Brentano. These include the
> > characterization of perception as (1) intentional, and (2) pre-
> > reflectively self-aware (1874: 153-189).
> (2) is, for me, the sticking point. I think this is so, but I've never
> been able to derive it. What do you think, Joe?
> > We may distinguish
> > between these two types of horizons by calling the first the world
> > horizon and members of the second type field horizons. The world
> > horizon contains all field horizons, and is reflectively approachable
> > but not apprehensible in its totality.
> The notion of a "cognitive horizon" is very, very subtle. Both Jaspers
> and Heidigger struggled with it. There is the idea that between the
> figure and the ground there is a discontinuity -- an emptiness, that
> is a horizon that points toward the "transrational" meaning of the
> immediate configuration. This is readily apparent in optical illusions
> of the alternating figure-ground type. When the ordinary perceptual
> background suddenly presents itself as, pari passu, a foreground, one
> is tempted to compare this with an event horizon which cannot radiate
> an image of its contents. In any event, a perceptual field always
> seems contained, and not merely by the geometry of the lens and
> retina, a metaperceptual context which, could we only perceive it,
> would totally interpret what we are looking at.
> I'd like to comment on your entire outstanding post, but the rules
> require self-restraint.
Do so privately, then (you have my addy), and I'll hold any
comments on your comments until I see them all.
> Best wishes,
> Robert M. Owen
> The Orion Institute
> 57 W. Morgan Street
> Brevard, NC 28712-3659 USA
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