From: Brett Paatsch (paatschb@optusnet.com.au)
Date: Mon Jun 30 2003 - 22:08:05 MDT
Emlyn O'regan writes:
> Personally, I've been finding continuing thinking on the
> nature of consciousness quite unsettling. The problem
>is as follows:
>
> Axiom: I am.
> Tenuous hypothesis 1: I have sensory input implying
> other stuff, and so it is too.
>
> Tenuous hypothesis 2: I am part of the set of other stuff.
>
> (much deduction, investigation, leading to negation of
> concept of conscious self; self is an illusion, "I" am just
> a pattern of information)
>
> I find that if I take Tenuous Hypotheses 1 & 2 as
> axioms, I produce the result:
>
> Result: I am not.
I don't see how you get to your result from 1 and 2.
Why not posit: "I" whatever "I" am, am party a self referential
processes or even set of processes. The "I" may not be a singular
process it may be a plurality. Perhaps some of these processes
contained in what we term crudely call the "self" are recursively
aware of the other processes in the "self".
We don't doubt we are multicellular though we talk of having
a body. Perhaps consciousness is a sets of precesses and to
refer to the self as though it is a singular thing is to make a similar
mistake as to assume our body is a single thing. The level of
abstraction at the body level and the "self" level losses too much
detail. Maybe.
Brett
> By my original axiom, I now have A and ~A. I've just flushed reality down
> the toilet. What is existence?
>
> I can't fault the materialist viewpoint, because I can't support the
> alternative; the closer I look, the more it appears that there is no
> possible role at all for any proposed non-physical piece of consciousness.
> So intelligent thought is a purely physical phenomenon, about information
> processing. Which means that "I" am not; "I" am an illusion (fooling who?
> what?).
>
> I can only find paradox at the base of any search for an explanation of
the
> only phenomenon in the universe that I can definitely call axiomatic (that
I
> am). To me, it is more clearly evident than the existence of anything
else.
> But apparently it cannot be true.
>
> Help.
> Emlyn
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Brett Paatsch [mailto:paatschb@optusnet.com.au]
> > Sent: Tuesday, 1 July 2003 5:58 AM
> > To: extropians@extropy.org
> > Subject: Re: Cryonics and uploading as leaps of faith?
> >
> >
> > Giu1i0 Pri5c0 writes:
> >
> > > Of course it is correct that we do not yet know as much as
> > > we should on brain and consciousness. At the same time
> > > the point that I am trying to make is independent of a
> > > particular mechanism of consciousness:
> > >
> > > Question A: does the uploaded copy of person X wake up
> > > thinking and feeling that (s)he is X? Does (s)he feel continuity
> > > with X (going to sleep - waking up)?
> >
> > Yes and yes. Assuming, as we have been, that the upload works.
> >
> > Indeed the test of whether the upload has worked is likely to be
> > does Xprime think (s)he is X and does everyone else relate to
> > Xprime as X.
> >
> > > This is a scientific question that can be answered with a simple
> > > experiment: just ask the uploaded copy of X. I assume the
> > > answer depends on the details of a uploading technology, like
> > > how much and what kind of information it is able to copy and
> > > restore. I think this technology is a few decades away at least,
> > > but it seems reasonable to think that it will be developed sooner
> > > or later.
> >
> > Well, the uploading technology is unlikely to be *built* until it can
> > be designed. Seems we are unlikely to be satisfied with the design
> > until we have a better understanding of what we take for
> > "consciousness" and the "self".
> >
> > > Question B: assuming that the answer to Question A is yes (the
> > > uploaded copy feels that (s)he is X), is (s)he REALLY X?
> > >
> > > This does not look like a scientific question, since its formulation
> > > is such that it cannot be verified or falsified.
> >
> > Agreed.
> >
> > Goedel's Incompleteness Theorem: There are certain propositions
> > that are true that cannot be proven.
> >
> > Do you think the consciousness of any other person you know
> > is a scientifically veriable hypothesis? I think it can only
> > be inferred.
> >
> > Do you think your own is even to you? I think it can only be
> > assumed.
> >
> > Without assuming it you have *no base* from which to formulate
> > scientific questions or any other types of questions.
> >
> > > Of course we still tend to feel uneasy: when it comes to survival,
> > > everyone is the Most Selfish Individual. We cannot help thinking
> > > that Question B matters very much. The answer that I choose is:
> > > it does not matter.
> >
> > A leap of faith?
> >
> > > I can accept as a continuation of my current
> > > identity any conscious being who thinks that he is a continuation
> > > of my current identity. I could not go to sleep if I could not
> > > accept this.
> >
> > A leap of faith for peace of mind?
> >
> >
> > > Brett:
> > > > Because I don't *know* enough about how my consciousness
> > > > and the experience of self-hood manifests to assume that it can
> > > > persist completely decoupled from a matter substrate for any
> > > > length of time. My current thinking is no substrate means no
> > > > conscious processing (or unconscious processing either). No
> > > > consciousness process means no self concept process. In short
> > > > I assume that no brain means a discontinuation of me because it
> > > > seems prudent to do so.
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