From: Lee Corbin (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Date: Sun Jun 29 2003 - 09:00:45 MDT
> So, operationally from the outside and from the inside the uploaded copy is
> the original. I wonder then what the meaning of "but the uploaded copy is
> not REALLY the original" can be.
I think that you ask an excellent question, and your
analysis is not quite like anything I've seen. To be
honest, I think that what they are thinking of is a
soul, more or less. Yes, the notion has been forced
into the unconscious, but it's operating still.
> Perhaps we should use "feels like" instead than the difficult "is". I feel
> like me because I remember the things that I remember (including what I
> donīt consciously remember at this moment) or, in other words, because of
> the specific information coded in my brain. This is I believe the simplest
Yes; in every way your uploaded copy---or even you if you
are disintegrated at 10am tomorrow morning and then instantly
re-integrated using the same or different atoms---will have
this same impression. It could, even now, be happening a
hundred times a second.
> So if the information coded in my brain is transferred somewhere
> else, someone will wake up feeling that he is me. I consider this
> enough, because I do not care too much about "is".
> I think when one dies consciousness goes on, even if that particular
> individual stream of consciousness stops. There are still thinkers thinking
> thoughts. Of course you can accepts this as a partial "answer" only is you
> believe that each consciousness is fundamentally the same, in other words
> that there is no physical or spiritual "signature" other than information
> that defines the difference between you and I.
8^D Yes---after you have taken away everything else (all
the information in your brain) then what is left over is
the pure consciousness that is the same in everyone. And
what is that? It's the same thing that you are left with
when you have removed all the outer layers of an onion.
> So when I die "I" will continue as another thinker thinking other thoughts
> and remembering other things: this "I" (weak I) is already preserved. If
> what I am interested in is preserving a "strong I" (the thinker who is
> thinking these specific thoughts and remembering these specific things),
> then I do not see anything wrong with uploading when it is technically
> Sorry this was not very clear, perhaps language is not really equipped for
> this. It would be interesting to put it in better words.
On the contrary, I think that you have made one of the arguments
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Sun Jun 29 2003 - 09:12:28 MDT