Re: Why believe the truth?

From: Robin Hanson (rhanson@gmu.edu)
Date: Tue Jun 17 2003 - 17:26:02 MDT

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    At 05:46 PM 6/17/2003 -0400, Eliezer S. Yudkowsky wrote:
    >... review: what is it, if anything, that we still disagree about? I
    >would say that, even instrumentally, the benefits of rationality are
    >higher than the losses, and that the costs involved do not alter this. I
    >am under the impression you still disagree with this, ...

    The part I'm not sure whether we agree is on the best strategy for someone
    who generally accepts the goals that evolution has given them, a standard
    mix of life, status, children, etc., and in a situation where the future
    will not be that different from the 20th century or before. The vast
    majority of humanity believes they are in this situation. In this
    situation, I claim the extra effort to substantially overcome our inherited
    biases and be more rational than we naturally would be seems usually more
    effort that it is worth, given the goals specified. Evolution has in fact
    equipped humans with behavioral strategies roughly appropriate to such
    situations. I do grant that in the situation you think you are in, where
    your goals and the future you face are very different from what evolution
    has equipped you to deal with, being unnaturally rational may well be a
    better strategy. So, do we disagree or not?

    >>As an aside, I actually have high hopes that we can improve people's
    >>incentives to be rational in their contributions to collective consensus
    >>via wider use of betting markets. People are more rational when they
    >>bet, for obvious reasons.
    >
    >Depends on the bias. If I recall the research correctly, most biases
    >studied don't go away because of minor financial incentives. Whether an
    >entire market with major incentives can, over time, build up a discipline
    >and a body of knowledge to beat bias, is a separate issue. But, yes, I
    >agree that rationality may be substantially improved.

    The incentive effect is weak, yes, but the selection effect can be much
    stronger. The people who participate most in betting markets turn out to
    be less biased than the average person.

    Robin Hanson rhanson@gmu.edu http://hanson.gmu.edu
    Assistant Professor of Economics, George Mason University
    MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030-4444
    703-993-2326 FAX: 703-993-2323



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