From: Dan Fabulich (dfabulich@warpmail.net)
Date: Tue Jun 17 2003 - 03:06:22 MDT
Robin Hanson wrote:
> >Hence, with the use of approximating models, we can get 99% of the value
> >of believing a falsehood without actually doing so. ...
>
> I think you vastly over-estimate the ability of most people to pretend
> to believe things that they do not actually believe. The reason that
> evolution has equipped us with biased beliefs about such things is that
> people are actually pretty good at detecting insincerity.
I think you, in turn, vastly underestimate our capacity to become immersed
in models. (Er, not the living kind.) As we all know, it's easy to get
into the "zone" and forget about crucial details for a while, or, if not
forget about them, then just let them sink back into our unconscious.
Ask an average man with an average girlfriend whether he really believes
his girlfriend is the beautifulest, (in private, of course, and under
conditions of trust, etc.) and I think he'll concede that, when he
considers it carefully, she's not the most beautiful girl *in the world*,
but, you know, she's _close enough_. Since it's easy enough not to let
that be a constant factor in your consciousness, it's easy enough to let
that slide into the background as you engage in close relations.
> > > You might tell your girlfriend that she is average ...
> >
> >I'd like to call attention to the fact that this is exactly the sort of
> >thing that a person "acting as if" the shared social model were true would
> >*not* do. The obvious disaster cases can be safely avoided 99% of the
> >time just by being aware of the flaws in our standard intuitions, but
> >still managing to be polite regardless.
>
> Your girlfriend will not be satisfied with your being polite and never
> bringing up the subject of what you think of her. She will ask you, if
> need be. And she will look closely to see if you believe what you say.
And I'll tell her she's the best. This isn't a merely hypothetical
question... this has worked out well in the past. It'd take a rather
unusual person, far from the evolutionarily selected norm, to respond to
"you're the best" with "hah! no I'm not, you're a liar and I'm calling
your bluff!" Perhaps a coy denial... ah, but that's all part of the
delicious game of flirting.
Anyway, I'd argue, against your claim, that the strategy I describe is, in
fact, what's used by most people, contra your claim that they are mostly
self-deceived most of the time.
You, on the other hand, seem to be pursuing a distinctly irrational
strategy at the moment. I think if you believe what you say, you should
stop doing so immediately, on its own terms. All these dismal truths are
precisely the sort of thing you argue we're supposed to disbelieve for our
own good, isn't it?
In that regard, arguing that the true is anything but what it is right to
believe is, in a way, self-defeating. In particular, I consider it a fact
of ethical logic that, for any X, we shouldn't believe the claim *:
(*) Although X is false, we should believe X anyway.
Note how this is different from showing directly that * is false: my claim
is merely that you shouldn't believe *. But, of course, if you believe my
argument, then you'll agree with me that * must be false for any X.
I might add that your claim that most people seem to be mostly
self-deceived about most of what's around them, especially in particular
areas of discourse, seem vulnerable to (Donald) Davidsonian arguments: I'd
say that we could not say of a society that we understand what they are
saying and that they are radically mistaken about most of what they're
saying. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/davidson/
Still too weak for ya? ;)
-Dan
-unless you love someone-
-nothing else makes any sense-
e.e. cummings
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