From: Adrian Tymes (wingcat@pacbell.net)
Date: Sat May 17 2003 - 13:10:49 MDT
--- Chris Hibbert <cth@pancrit.org> wrote:
> > So, is there an attack here I don't see? If so,
> can you plug the
> > hole, or come up with a system with the same
> safeguards?
>
> Your system makes it straightforward for people to
> buy and sell votes.
> ("After the election, bring me your ballot, and
> if it includes a
> vote for X, I'll pay you $Y.") This is normally
> considered a weakness
> in a voting system. Unfortunately, any system that
> tries to enforce
> accountability in the voting system would seem to
> have this problem.
> It would be a great contribution to show that they
> are compatible.
Hmm. Perhaps if verification included information
that
the voter would have, but that the cost of revelation
to other people would far exceed most compensation?
For instance, if people in general knew that revealing
their Social Security number would cost them $Z on
average, then so long as $Z > $Y, preferably $Z >> $Y,
where $Y is what a vote would be worth to most
parties,
then this should at least minimize (though not
eliminate) this problem. (Very poor people would
likely have a very low $Z, so for them, $Y > $Z. Then
again, this might be the only reason they vote at all,
if they are so poor that they do not see any of the
choices helping them personally.)
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