Re: Duplicates are Selves

From: Eliezer S. Yudkowsky (sentience@pobox.com)
Date: Sun Apr 06 2003 - 01:57:41 MST

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    Hal Finney wrote:
    >
    > Being duplicated, so that there are two of you, A and B, is fundamentally
    > different from going through a many-worlds split, which results also
    > in two of you, A and B. The difference is that your total measure
    > is twice as much in the duplication scenario as in the MW scenario.
    > This is a real, meaningful difference and it may be enough to justify
    > different decisions regarding these situations.

    Yes, I think this may be the origin of our disagreement. Under my current
    formulation of ethics, I automatically renormalize any number of
    duplicates or many-world branches such that their total subjective
    probability from my current standpoint is 100%. Why should we renormalize
    probabilities for computationally independent branches of many-worlds, and
    yet not renormalize them for ordinary duplicates? After the split, the
    duplicates will be two independent people who are each worth One Person.
    But the original Eliezer, who did the splitting, is also only worth One
    Person - that there are two of him in the future does not change this.
    Instead, when calculating his One Person's worth, we weight each of
    Eliezer-A's and Eliezer-B's futures by 50% apiece, or if it's a
    many-worlds branch, whatever their relative amplitude decrees. We have to
    do different calculations to find the value of Eliezer's future, the value
    of Eliezer-A's future, and the value of Eliezer-B's future. When people
    branch you must calculate the future value for *observer-moments* rather
    than *observers*. The future value of Eliezer is the renormalized
    weighted sum of Eliezer-A and Eliezer-B. On the other hand, the future
    value of Eliezer-A is the renormalized sum of Eliezer-A's futures. If I
    should buy a quantum lottery ticket in a many-worlds universe and win the
    lottery, I would not thereafter figure that my life had only
    1/250,000,000th its former value, even though the happy event was only
    weighted at 1/250,000,000th by my previous self. I would just renormalize
    the futures in that branch.

    But that's just a guess. I really wish I understood what was up with
    those complex amplitudes. It seems to say reality is thinking about
    measure in a different way than I am. I've tried to adapt, but...

    -- 
    Eliezer S. Yudkowsky                          http://singinst.org/
    Research Fellow, Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence
    


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