From: Harvey Newstrom (mail@HarveyNewstrom.com)
Date: Sat Apr 05 2003 - 11:58:28 MST
Lee Corbin wrote,
> Yes, but the point is that some people argue that the very
> identities of their atoms *are* important, and that they'd have
> no objection to teleportation if they didn't have this lingering
> feeling that "their" original atoms were back in the previous
> teleporter pod reduced to piles of elements.
Can you point out any examples of this argument or person? I can't see even
religious people believing in a soul caring about which atoms are used. I
think this is a false assumption about people who don't think copies
preserve identity. There also is a third belief (held by me) that both
copies preserve identity, but that neither should be destroyed.
I think we are wasting time discussing whether individual atoms are
important until we actually find someone who holds this belief.
> More to the point, there exist some concepts of self, for example
> concepts that would survive extremely rapid evolution, which I
> think are just incorrect concepts. Some people, who I have
> referred to as "radical uploaders", e.g. Ralph Merkle, would
> not mind evolving one second from now into creatures so advanced
> that they would resemble us no more than we resemble the fetuses
> from which we grew. If that happened to me, I contend, then
> I'd be dead as soon as it happened.
I fall into this category. I don't care how fast I change, as long as I can
comprehend and process the changes as they occur. If I had a very fast
Jupiter brain, it would seem to me that each change is a minor adjustment.
I would live through all the changes as they occur and continue to recognize
myself as me no matter how radical I become.
This prompts me to make a completing list of levels for teleportation. I
believe the question boils down to what is being persevered. Therefore I
would guess that the following types of preferences would exist:
1. Preserve the same atoms. Break them apart and reassemble elsewhere.
2. Preserve the same pattern. Break them apart and reassemble different
atoms elsewhere.
3. Preserve the same appearance. A similar looking body or simulation
replaced the original.
4. Preserve the same continuity of body. Add and subtract small pieces
repeatedly until the result is achieved.
5. Preserve the same continuity of mind. Keep the conscious thinking
process running with no interruption.
6. Preserve the same external functionality. This would be the Turing test
on a simulation. If other people can't tell the difference, it is good
enough.
7. Preserve the same information. Copy every atom or every neuron or every
thought onto a static substrate, like a book or CD, and it is good enough.
These are not levels, but separate choices to preserve different aspects of
ourselves. My choice is 5. I do not know how to do this without also
having choice 4 at the same time. I do not know how to transfer mind
without a physical connection to the body. I do not know how to "move" the
mind without doing a destructive copy.
The perfect scenario for me would be to graft a computer to my brain and
replace each neuron's function with the computer one at a time until the
whole brain function is transferred to the computer. Although this destroys
each neuron, the whole mind function is not disrupted and clearly ends up
running inside the computer.
> Because I've always intuited that my duplicate and I would
> agree on all matters (seeing quite eye to eye), I have never
> supposed that a sensible person would be unable to work all
> this out with his duplicate. Moreover, I claim that one should
> have an extremely good feeling about the fact that one has a
> duplicate, because whatever it is that you value in being alive
> at all, according to physics you have twice as much to value.
This is my view. The duplicate has value. Destroying either one of the
copies diminishes my presence in the universe by some amount.
-- Harvey Newstrom, CISSP, IAM, GSEC <www.HarveyNewstrom.com>
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