From: Harvey Newstrom (mail@HarveyNewstrom.com)
Date: Sat Apr 05 2003 - 11:22:40 MST
Robert J. Bradbury wrote,
> Harvey and Lee raise some very interesting points vis-a-vis whether
> teleportation has to use the same atoms.
>
> I think Lee then said:
> > I was astonished early last year to learn that some highly
> > intelligent and thoughtful list members will not teleport.
> > That is, on my "Seven Levels of Identity", they are at level
> > one or two.
>
> My conclusion is that Harvey & Lee know different sets of people.
It could be. I don't think that I have heard anybody on the Extropians list
claim that we need to retain our same atoms to retain identity. I think
this is a common misunderstanding that one side assumes for the other side.
Does anybody claim this viewpoint for themselves?
The soul references are similar. I have seen both sides explain why the
"other" side must believe in a soul to explain their objection. But I don't
know anybody who claims this view for themselves.
I think there is a lot of misconceptions about what the "other" side thinks.
Most of the arguments in this debate prove something that the other side
doesn't care about. It argues against points the other side doesn't
believe.
> I think one problem with these levels is that they seem to presume
> the retention of the current concept of an "individual". In a
> Jupiter Brain or a Matrioshka Brain one's "individuality" may become
> so interconnected with the "collective" that it becomes relatively
> difficult or impossible to teleport an individual at all.
This is where semantics comes in. We are facing new situations that have
never occurred before. Questions about identity, individualism, and the
like beg the question of what these terms mean when copies, backups,
distributions, and collectives are possible.
> Lee continues:
> > I claim that this decision rests with owner of the resources,
> > perhaps just the owner of the atoms involved. For example, if
> > someone came to me and wanted to be teleported to New York, and
> > insisted that he would permit me to gratify his wish only if I
> > also arranged for the destruction of the original, I would
> > reluctantly agree.
> >
> > But it *is* a dumb waste, isn't it?
>
> No, not if its Lee -- one copy is *completely* sufficient.
> :-)
Sufficient for what? One copy of Lee is sufficient to continue the
situation of having one Lee. But after you have made two copies of Lee,
there are more possibilities. Two copies can go in two directions and do
more things. Two Lees are better than one. Now that we have these
additional possibilities, destroying one Lee is a loss. Going back to one
Lee reduces the mobility of Lee, the total brain matter of Lee, the number
of hands Lee can use, the number of places Lee can visit concurrently, etc.
Saying that the one Lee at the end is equivalent to the one Lee at the
beginning ignores the additional Lee in the meantime. It is like saying I
have no children now, I can produce children, kill them, and everything ends
up like it was before. Some would claim that nothing is lost, but once
these individuals exist, it is a loss when they cease to exist.
The real question seems to boil down to whether anyone would value a
duplicate copy. Many people seem to be assuming that after there is one
Lee, another Lee is useless. I don't share that view. I would love to be
able to duplicate myself and have an exact copy with my viewpoints and
history to help me work on my projects. I would greatly value additional
copies as useful persons. A loss of any of these after they were created
would be a loss.
> > The core problem is that most people do not realize that they
> > are both the original and the copy, in a peculiar way that
> > evidently we haven't been prepared by evolution to understand
> > intuitively. Duplicates are self.
>
> Yep. This is the heart of the problem. We just don't have a
> frame of reference for dealing with copies of ourselves.
Just because I don't care doesn't mean I don't understand. :-)
I keep insisting that I agree that after a copy operation, both copies are
"me", and "I" am both copies. I still don't want any of "me" killed. I
would no more want a copy destroyed just because it is a duplicate, than I
would give up one of my arms on the theory that I already have another one.
I can do more with more copies. You are assuming that I don't believe the
other copy is "me", which is why I won't suicide my original. But even when
I agree, it does not change my position.
-- Harvey Newstrom, CISSP, IAM, GSEC <www.HarveyNewstrom.com>
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