RE: Duplicates are Selves

From: Lee Corbin (lcorbin@tsoft.com)
Date: Fri Apr 04 2003 - 21:08:31 MST

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    Harvey writes

    > > So, I'll just go back to my former claim: if you believe physics
    > > with all your heart, and so don't suppose that the particular atoms
    > > that you are composed of have anything to do with who you are, then
    > > you won't mind teleporting, because the pattern of atoms will be
    > > the same after as before.
    >
    > I think this is true. I am not sure I know of anyone who objects to being
    > teleported in this manner.

    I was astonished early last year to learn that some highly
    intelligent and thoughtful list members will not teleport.
    That is, on my "Seven Levels of Identity", they are at level
    one or two.

    (The seven levels are
     
    1. Will travel by space warp, but won't permit disassembly of atoms.
    2. Will permit teleportation, but only if the same atoms are used.
    3. Will teleport, unless there is a delay.
    4. Will teleport, but finds backups to be useless.
    5. Finds backups acceptable, provided that they've had no run time.
    6. Anticipates future experiences of duplicates, but only one in
        particular.
    7. Logically, but not necessarily emotionally, anticipates all
        experiences of all duplicates past or future, near or far.

    and since I can't see how to reference Extropy posts from October,
    I'll have to post the above list with explanations again soon.)

    > The objections occur after the teleportation is complete and there
    > are now two identical copies. For a "destructive copy", we then want
    > to kill one of the copies. Is this act acceptable or not?

    I claim that this decision rests with owner of the resources,
    perhaps just the owner of the atoms involved. For example, if
    someone came to me and wanted to be teleported to New York, and
    insisted that he would permit me to gratify his wish only if I
    also arranged for the destruction of the original, I would
    reluctantly agree.

    But it *is* a dumb waste, isn't it?

    > Some people do not see a problem with this. Others don't want either copy
    > killed. This is the main objection to "destructive" copying. It is not the
    > copy operation, but the destruction operation that is disputed.

    The core problem is that most people do not realize that they
    are both the original and the copy, in a peculiar way that
    evidently we haven't been prepared by evolution to understand
    intuitively. Duplicates are self.

    > The decision whether it is "acceptable" to kill one out of multiple copies
    > boils down to a philosophical question of ethics. I don't think physics can
    > answer this ethical question.

    That's right. I would have to magically cross the is/ought
    barrier to persuade my customer that there is no reason
    whatsoever to demand the destruction of his original. (The
    fool probably is afraid that the original is going to go
    home and sleep with his wife. What is the emoticon for utter
    exasperation?)

    > The question of whether each copy would allow themselves to
    > die boils down to a question of personal choice. I don't think
    > physics can answer this personal question of choice either.

    Yes, although I suspect that a totally consistent value system
    would not be compatible with the result that an intricate and
    rather marvelous assemblage of atoms (such as the original)
    should be destroyed without a good reason.

    Lee



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