From: gts (gts_2000@yahoo.com)
Date: Wed Feb 12 2003 - 07:32:32 MST
Emlyn O'regan wrote:
> The classic reason for parallel universes to be depressing is because
> they negate free will. No matter what "you" decide to do here,
> somewhere else every other possible choice (and action) is made by
> "you" (and by your environment).
I think this depressing line of thinking can be traced to a false
definition of identity, the same false definition against which I railed
so vociferously (and probably to no avail) with fellows like Corbin and
Rafal a couple of months ago.
As I see it, those other instances of "you" in alternate MWI universes
are not actually you in any meaningful (non-nominal) way, so their
decisions and activities should be of no concern to you for purposes of
asking questions about your possible free will or lack of it. Those
alternates of you are you only in *nominal* ways: they look like you and
carry identification cards that look similar to yours. Otherwise they
are not you in any meaningful *non-nominal* way.
They are "you" nominally, i.e., they are qualitatively you in the same
way that all people named "Emyln" are you. I'm sure you'll agree it
would be a nonsensical to expand your idea of self to include all people
named "Emyln." I maintain that we make the same mistake when we try to
expand our identities to include alternate versions of ourselves in
alternate MWI universes. The temptation to do so is greater only because
those alternates share much more than our simple names: many of them
share duplicates or near duplicates of our families and of our homes and
friends, etc, but these duplicated elements are objectively no different
than the duplications of our nominal names. In *non-nominal ways* each
of our alternates are entirely different from one another, each with his
own personal experience of living.
As evidence of this, consider a thought experiment in which one of those
other instances of you were to, by some miracle of physics, suddenly
appear in this (your) universe. You could, if you so desired, kill that
alternate instance of yourself and then go on living as though he had
never existed. Granted it might be a crime and it might be emotionally
distressing to see an alternative of oneself be killed, but in essence
your life would continue normally. If the murder took place at someone
else's hand, without your knowledge, then you would be none the wiser
for it. That murdered instance of "you" cannot therefore rightly be
considered to have been you.
However we may ultimately decide to define human self-identity, surely
the capacity to experience one's own individual existence is a necessary
prerequisite. So then, if I terminate the existence of entity A without
entity B's knowledge, and if B then continues without noticing a
difference in his life due to the termination of A, then surely entity A
is not entity B! For this reason our alternates in alternate universes
should by no means be considered ourselves. If they cannot be considered
ourselves then their existence can have no bearing on questions of our
free will.
-gts
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