Re: Where the I is

From: avatar (avatar@renegadeclothing.com.au)
Date: Wed Feb 12 2003 - 02:36:58 MST

  • Next message: Anders Sandberg: "Re: Parallel Universes"

    Lee Corbin notes I diverge from the "I" discussion to uploading.
    True... still, consciousness and uploading are interlinked discussions,
    both interlink with the idea of consent.

    I believe that Tipler in the particular scenario of the Omega Point
    theory of his book envisages us upgrading ourselves (or perhaps
    uploading) into energy states (as all the matter in the universe is
    transmogrified cosmologically in any case) and these are integrated
    into the universal (truly) turing machine/computer matrix, which then
    one presumes uses the photon signatures etc. to reconstruct the bodies
    of the earlier dead just as they are about to die (prior to brain death)
    in virtualities which are made to allow for such (correct particle
    configurations, etc.) and then presumably these beings get to go through
    their options. But this process which occurs through quantum splitting
    is not strictly speaking uploading but splitting. There will have to be some
    mechanism for the Omega Point matrix to reconfigure the dying person
    (split B) to stop the process of death (or alternatively to then upload the
    dying person into a body which has no injuries or is a substratum of
    computronium).

    Of course, Tipler may be wrong about the whole procedure. What is
    exciting about Tipler for me is:

    . quantum splitting
    . the demonstration that nanotech probes can reach all or most of the full
    universe
    . articulation of the principle of transference of the apparently dead
    . articulation of the principle of seeking full extropy (infinite growth) [as you
    know, some writers speculate even heat death can be used for this purpose]..

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    Lee wants to know why I'm an augmenter rather than uploader.

    I reject uploading because of the principle of continuity being breached [and the
    duplicate is only a rough approximation not quantum and therefore according to
    Tipler a "split"].

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    Just as an aside, Tipler does not talk about uploading everyone. Somewhat
    sadly, in view of his otherwise wise thinking, he bows not just to generic
    statements of support for monotheism but also makes the statement that
    bad people will be left behind (an argument shared by many Christian churches
    and some proponents of computronium matrixes/uploading). Personally my main
    thrust ethically has always been to promote the notion of universal consensual
    protective shielding as an alternative to non-consensual force or "leaving behind"
    people to oblivion [this ties in with preventing non-consensual heavens and hells,
    if actual overtually or virtually].

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    As another aside, I note that computronium has the potential to be both a neural
    seat for a personality or an inforoad. That is, it can augment your brain, it can be
    the whole of your brain, it can be used to connect brains through sensory
    exchange or data exchange and it can be used as a matrix for all of these.

    In a way you could have an "internet, a "sensornet" and a "thought-pattern-by-
    consensual-exchangenet".

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    Lee writes:
    > I want to know why you do not consider your present atomic
    > configuration to be a near-duplicate of your state yesterday.

    As I hold time travel to be unethical, without gaining the consent of
    every person affected, the question does not arise for me.

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    Lee writes on whether it is ethical to create a new being with
    memories inbuilt:

    > What makes new random memories preferable to the old?
    > Reminiscent of the way that many on this list highly
    > value the memories and experiences of 85 year olds,
    > your seem to be claiming that null memories are
    > preferable to an 85 year old's, or at least that
    > the {destruction of 85-year-old's memories + insertion
    > of new random memories} is to you preferable to a
    > continuation of the 85-year-old's experiences.

    Ok: re: new births:

    Memory insertion should be by consent, and
    consent requires adulthood. Since immature beings should be
    protected, I guess this preserves the current state of things
    (instinct-only birth, followed by adult memoryhood). Because we
    are rooted in time, there will always be a moment of immaturity.
    This is where my argument is weakest. For adults to assume
    divergent memory and identity, to remold their own, to graft such
    and reform, is all very well. But wholly new entities (i.e. not merged
    but neurologically independent and born)...

    they should have free will
    they should have the abililty to self-boost (upon adulthood)
    they should be able to attain adulthood (without this being unfairly delayed)
    and they should be able to choose to accept or reject the memories or specific
    personality patterns of another when reaching adulthood.

    Otherwise aren't we like Catholics, baptising babies at birth as "Catholics for
    eternity"?

    But if you don't believe uploading (creating) a non-quantum close-duplicate without
    broadcast linkage to you (the "original") is a birth process, then the above moral
    issues don't arise as it's "you".

    So there you have a real difference of opinion.

    It's not as bad as "rewiring out" a brain's patterning to superimpose your own, but it
    is an issue. I guess one can only say, if there really are "two" persons involved, how
    would you have felt about being born with the memories of your father? Would you
    have minded? Would you like your son or daughter to have your memories on birth, to
    build upon?

    I guess there is also the issue of potential, obvious in the human fetus versus 2-3 year
    old argument. Memory-insertion into a developing-birthed being? Can one make an adult
    from scratch without memory-insertion? Can consciousness exist without discrete
    memory, even in non-human forms of consciousness maps?

    Food for thought...

    Avatar



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