In a message dated 12/11/1999 11:28:05 PM EST, zharadon@inconnect.com writes:
<< This touches on the idea of direct access, or incorrigibility - the idea
that you cannot be mistaken about what you are feeling. I am going on the
assumption that it is indisputable that you can be wrong when you think you
feel something. You cannot think you are in pain and "not really be" in
pain. Regarding the example someone might bring up of phantom pain felt by
amputees - these people really do "feel pain", they are mistaken in the fact
that they have an appendage which is undergoing some damage, but they are
not mistaken in the fact that they "feel pain". Some philosophers (for
example both of the Churchlands) believe it is possible to be mistaken about
what you are feeling. Paul Churchland gives the example of being tied in a
chair and tortured by someone who keeps pressing hot coals into your back -
one of the times he presses an ice cube into your back - according to
Churchland, you think you feel a burn, but you actually feel cold.
Churchland is very confused on this issue - you actually DO feel burn - you
are mistaken about the cause of it, but you cannot be mistaken about what
you are feeling.
So, a zombie might deceive others in convincing them that he is conscious,
but you cannot be a zombie and deceive yourself into believing that you are
not, because you know (in a deeper sense, you are) your feelings. I would
indeed "say exactly that", but I wouldn't think exactly that. You are
looking for evidence that I can convince you that I am not a zombie. There
is none. This is an entirely different issue from that of what evidence you
can present yourself that you are not. >>
I agree with Zeb. From my understanding of "feeling", it is impossible to feel something you don't "really" feel. The act of feeling is feeling. Now, you can very easily have an inaccurate model of what any given feeling actually means. Sensory information can be misinterpreted so as to produce feelings they normally would not, and concepts about what certain sensations represent could be completely mistaken.
Glen Finney