>Look. Suppose I made a copy of you who was a zombie. He acted like you
>in every way, but he had no experiences, no qualia, etc.
First of all there is no way he could act like me without my experiences. I am my transcendental thread dude.
If you made an exact copy of me (the zombie), my experiences (memories)
would be physically stored in this duplicate's brain too. So yes he would
believe he was a zombie because he would have my experiences in him. HE
would remember having voodoo dust blown up his nose and the frightening
memory of being buried alive. (if the voodoo dust was of the amnesia
enducing variation, this would be the exception, but then me, the real
zombie would not know I was a zombie either)
>Would he believe he was a zombie? No. He'd be just like you: he'd insist
>that qualia are real, that he is having an undeniable internal experience
>right now, etc.
And you are having the qualia of adrenalin rush as you read this response beacause you understand the semantics of this syntactical message.
If I asked that zombie "how do you know you're not a
>zombie?" what would he tell me?
(he wouldn't understand your question because he has no experiences as you stated. he's never experienced language so you would sound like the teacher on a Charlie Brown episode)
Now if you duplicated me minus the experiences, his qualia would be that of infantile curiosity, the blank slate with only instinctual processes. Everything would be a new blur of color and sound, but then as this new fledgeling zombie's experiences grew and were organized into patterns and proven consistencies, and he began to decipher language, then he would be on his way to experiencing the complex and exhilerating qualia that both you and I are capable of (due to our vast data bases of memories that can interact with our current perceptions).
Delayed right now.... jeff nordahl
> -unless you love someone-
> -nothing else makes any sense-
> e.e. cummings